Defining Flight Risk
Lauryn P. Gouldin†
Our illogical and too-well-traveled paths to pretrial detention have created
staggering costs for defendants who spend unnecessary time in pretrial detention
and for taxpayers who fund a broken system. These problems remain recalcitrant
even as a third generation of reform efforts makes impressive headway. They are
likely to remain so until judges, attorneys, legislators, and scholars address a fundamental definitional problem: the collapsing of very different types of behavior
that result in failures to appear in court into a single, undifferentiated category of
nonappearance risk. That single category muddies critical distinctions that this
Article’s new taxonomy of pretrial nonappearance risks clarifies. This taxonomy
(i) isolates true flight risk (the risk that a defendant will flee the jurisdiction) from
other forms of “local” nonappearance risk and (ii) distinguishes between local nonappearance risks based on persistence, willfulness, amenability to intervention,
and cost.
Upon examination, it is clear that flight and nonappearance are not simply
interchangeable names for the same concept, nor are they merely different degrees
of the same type of risk. In the context of measuring and managing risks, many defendants who merely fail to appear differ in important ways from their fugitive
cousins. Precision about these distinctions is constitutionally mandated and statutorily required. It is also essential for current reform efforts that are aimed at identifying less intrusive and lower-cost interventions that can effectively manage the
full range of nonappearance and flight risks. These distinctions are not reflected in
the pretrial risk-assessment tools that are increasingly being employed across the
country. But they should be. A more nuanced understanding of these differences
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will be a key piece of broader efforts to reduce judicial reliance on pretrial detention and to mitigate the risks posed by defendants on release.
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INTRODUCTION
The number of low-risk defendants who spend time in pretrial detention in this country is staggering: “Every year, more
than 11 million people move through America’s 3,100 local jails,
many on low-level, non-violent misdemeanors.”1 According to a

1
FACT SHEET: Launching the Data-Driven Justice Initiative: Disrupting the
Cycle of Incarceration (White House Office of the Press Secretary, June 30, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/QKE5-PJVH (“On any given day, across the country more than
450,000 people are held in jail before trial.”).
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Department of Justice estimate, up to two-thirds of the members
of this population pose “no significant risk to . . . the community”
and “a low risk of flight.”2 In a study in New York City, Human
Rights Watch documented similarly high rates of overuse of pretrial detention: more than 20 percent of pretrial detainees
charged with misdemeanors were not ultimately convicted and
over half of those who were convicted were not sentenced to incarceration.3 Studies show that nine out of ten pretrial felony
detainees remain incarcerated because they cannot afford their
bail,4 demonstrating the system’s inequities and inefficiencies.
The tragic death of Kalief Browder highlights layers of systemic dysfunction. After being arrested as a sixteen-year-old,
Browder spent three years in pretrial detention at Rikers Island,
mostly in solitary confinement, and was released only when the
charges against him were eventually dropped.5 Browder’s pretrial detention was not justified by any public-safety claim,6 and
given his family’s limited resources, he was not likely to flee the
jurisdiction. Nevertheless, the judge set bail at a figure that
Browder and his family could not afford ($3,000), and Browder
was detained.7 He remained in jail because he refused to plead
guilty (even to a deal for time served) to a crime he said he had
not committed.8 Browder’s detention story is just one example of
the routine phenomenon of wealth-based pretrial detention that
cannot be justified as managing any cognizable or legitimate
2
ABA Criminal Justice Section, State Policy Implementation Project *2, archived
at http://perma.cc/K78U-HJ7Q.
3
Human Rights Watch, The Price of Freedom: Bail and Pretrial Detention of Low
Income Nonfelony Defendants in New York City *29–30 (Dec 2010), archived at
http://perma.cc/RC9D-H8TJ (noting that nonfelony defendants were serving time in jail
pretrial “only because they were unable to post bail”), quoting Mary T. Phillips, Pretrial
Detention and Case Outcomes, Part 1: Nonfelony Cases *59 (New York City Criminal
Justice Agency, Nov 2007), archived at http://perma.cc/P5FT-JWPZ.
4
Ram Subramanian, et al, Incarceration’s Front Door: The Misuse of Jails in
America *32 (Vera Institute of Justice, July 29, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/R8PT
-3PB7 (explaining that, of felony defendants who spend the full pretrial period in jail,
“only one in ten” is incarcerated because a judge denied bail and ordered him or her to be
detained and “[t]he rest simply cannot afford . . . bail”).
5
Tina Rosenberg, Putting Fewer Innocents behind Bars (NY Times, July 3, 2015),
archived at http://perma.cc/QVD9-7JJ2.
6
Id. Judges need not consider public-safety concerns in pretrial detention and bail
decisions. See NY Crim Proc Law § 510.30(2)(a).
7
Rosenberg, Putting Fewer Innocents behind Bars (cited in note 5). By the time
Browder’s family eventually raised the money, his status as an alleged probation violator
precluded release. Jennifer Gonnerman, Before the Law (New Yorker, Oct 6, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/GZ4Z-45E3 (first reporting Browder’s story).
8
Gonnerman, Before the Law (cited in note 7).
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risk.9 When Browder’s story was first reported in 2014, it
sparked public outrage and spurred efforts to reform pretrial detention policies.10 Tragically, Browder never recovered from his
experience, and he committed suicide in 2015.11 His death has
renewed and amplified calls for a range of pretrial reforms.12
Significant bail reforms are underway. Across the country,
constitutional and statutory amendments, impact litigation, and
community-based initiatives are forcing jurisdictions to change
their pretrial practices, sometimes dramatically.13 Much of the
focus in this active “third generation” of bail reform efforts is on
judicial decisionmaking.14 Judges deciding whether to release or
detain defendants before trial have broad discretion.15 They tend
9
See Alec Karakatsanis, Policing, Mass Imprisonment, and the Failure of
American Lawyers, 128 Harv L Rev F 253, 262 (2015) (describing pretrial hearings as an
“assembly line” moving impoverished people into “cages”). The fact that Browder remained in jail for three years is far from routine. Most defendants in his shoes accede to
the pressure to plead guilty—even if innocent—if it means immediate release from
Rikers. See Gonnerman, Before the Law (cited in note 7) (“In 2011, in the Bronx, only a
hundred and sixty-five felony cases went to trial; in three thousand nine hundred and
ninety-one cases, the defendant pleaded guilty.”).
10 See Randal John Meyer, Despite Public Outrage, Bail Reform Still Needed in
New York City (Huffington Post, Feb 22, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/ZM8H-M73Q;
Alysia Santo, No Bail, Less Hope: The Death of Kalief Browder (Marshall Project, June 9,
2015), archived at http://perma.cc/H79F-ZA4P.
11 Rosenberg, Putting Fewer Innocents behind Bars (cited in note 5).
12 Jim Dwyer, A Life That Frayed as Bail Reform Withered (NY Times, June 9,
2015), online at http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/10/nyregion/after-a-shocking-death-a
-renewed-plea-for-bail-reform-in-new-york-state.html (visited Nov 9, 2017) (Perma archive unavailable) (explaining that Browder’s story is an indictment of the criminal justice system broadly and not simply a story of failures at Rikers Island). In January 2016,
President Barack Obama retold Browder’s story while announcing a federal solitaryconfinement ban for juveniles in federal facilities. See Barack Obama, Barack Obama:
Why We Must Rethink Solitary Confinement (Wash Post, Jan 25, 2016), archived at
http://perma.cc/7GQR-8C5J.
13 See Part III.A (detailing current reforms).
14 See Kristin Bechtel, et al, Dispelling the Myths: What Policy Makers Need to
Know about Pretrial Research *2 n 1 (Pretrial Justice Institute, Nov 2012), archived at
http://perma.cc/C9RE-N9GY (explaining that the first wave of bail reform began in the
1960s, the second in the 1980s, and the third in the early 2000s); Timothy R. Schnacke,
Claire M.B. Brooker, and Michael R. Jones, The Third Generation of Bail Reform (Denver U L Rev Online, Mar 14, 2011), archived at http://perma.cc/F6MR-DZTU (discussing
the interrelated factors that form the genesis of the third generation of bail reform). See
also Sandra G. Mayson, Dangerous Defendants, 127 Yale L J 490, 515 (2018) (explaining
that the third-generation bail reform model “requires that judges have authority to order
pretrial preventive detention”).
15 See Samuel R. Wiseman, Fixing Bail, 84 Geo Wash L Rev 417, 424 (2016) (explaining that, even in jurisdictions where judges employ actuarial tools to assess a defendant’s risk of flight and/or dangerousness, most often judges “retain full discretion to
detain the defendant”); John S. Goldkamp and E. Rely Vîlcică, Judicial Discretion
and the Unfinished Agenda of American Bail Reform: Lessons from Philadelphia’s
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to overestimate the risks posed by defendants on release,16 and
because judges are notoriously risk averse, they err on the side
of detaining or otherwise overmanaging defendants.17
The proponents of risk-assessment tools assert that these
tools address flaws in judicial decisionmaking by supplementing
judicial decisionmaking, and countering judicial risk aversion,
with objective science and data.18 On June 30, 2016, the Obama
administration announced the Data-Driven Justice Initiative—a
multifaceted, nationwide effort to reduce unnecessary pretrial
detention.19 One of the initiative’s principal strategies is to “[u]se
data-driven, validated, pre-trial risk assessment tools” to ensure
that low-risk defendants are not detained before trial.20 The initiative endorsed a risk-assessment reform movement that has
already gained significant momentum. There is widespread enthusiasm for the prospect of “moneyballing” pretrial decisionmaking.21 By the time the Data-Driven Justice Initiative
was announced, jurisdictions across the country were already
using a range of different risk-assessment tools: a federal tool;
state-specific tools used in Colorado, Florida, Indiana, Ohio, and
Evidence-Based Judicial Strategy, in Austin Sarat, ed, Studies in Law, Politics, and
Society: Special Issue New Perspectives on Crime and Criminal Justice 115, 127
(Emerald 2009).
16 Lauryn P. Gouldin, Disentangling Flight Risk from Dangerousness, 2016 BYU L
Rev 837, 887–88 (describing judges’ tendency to overestimate pretrial risks). See also
Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, and Andrew J. Wistrich, Blinking on the Bench:
How Judges Decide Cases, 93 Cornell L Rev 1, 27–28 (2007) (explaining that judges “rely
heavily on their intuitive faculties” and that they often cannot override their intuitions
to clear the way for deliberative decisionmaking on the bench); Daniel Kahneman,
Thinking, Fast and Slow 300–02 (Farrar, Straus & Giroux 2013) (explaining that, generally, downside risks have much higher salience than upside gains).
17 See Laura and John Arnold Foundation, Developing a National Model for
Pretrial Risk Assessment *1 (Nov 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/YB6U-3KEY (noting
that judges’ subjective evaluations are not reliable risk assessments).
18 See, for example, id at *2 (describing the tools as facilitating a shift away “from a
system based solely on instinct and experience to one in which judges have access to scientific, objective risk assessment tools”); Gouldin, 2016 BYU L Rev at 888 (cited in note
16) (“Risk assessment tools address some of these concerns [of unconscious bias and
overestimation] by replacing reliance on subjective and intuitive judicial measures of
risk with more objective data that is insulated from cognitive bias.”).
19 See Launching the Data-Driven Justice Initiative (cited in note 1). The initiative
is a “bipartisan coalition,” with support from many organizations. Id.
20 Id.
21 See Anne Milgram, Moneyballing Criminal Justice (The Atlantic, June 20, 2012),
archived at http://perma.cc/YU9K-LRGV. “Moneyballing” refers to the practice of using
statistical analysis to achieve better and more efficient results. Id. The term is originally
derived from a 2003 book about the Oakland Athletics’ use of an innovative method of
data and statistical analysis to assemble a winning team on a limited budget. See generally Michael Lewis, Moneyball: The Art of Winning an Unfair Game (Norton 2003).
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Virginia; and a free tool developed by the Laura and John
Arnold Foundation that has been adopted in about thirty-eight
jurisdictions across the country, including three states (New
Jersey, Kentucky, and Arizona).22 The foundation has pledged to
continue the initiative’s work even if the Trump administration
discontinues it.23
An elusive issue, unsolved by past generations of bail reformers, threatens the new reform efforts’ success: ambiguity
regarding the risks that judges who set money bail or order pretrial detention are trying to mitigate or avoid. Even as scholars,
reformers, and practitioners are showing renewed interest in
pretrial detention and bail,24 there is little focus on one central
question: the appropriate meaning and role of what is often
called “flight risk.”25 What judges, attorneys, and scholars frequently describe in shorthand terms as “flight risk” is defined in
older statutes and in newer risk-assessment tools in significantly broader terms: the risk that a defendant will fail to appear for
a future court date.
Scholars,26 judges,27 and legislative drafters28 often use flight
and nonappearance interchangeably. But these terms are not
22 Public Safety Assessment (Laura and John Arnold Foundation, Feb 5, 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/TW2H-NN5Y. The Arnold Foundation estimated in 2015 that
approximately 10 percent of courts in the United States had adopted a risk-assessment
tool. Id. See also Gouldin, 2016 BYU L Rev at 867 (cited in note 16) (noting that the use
of risk-assessment tools is “rapidly growing”).
23 Laura and John Arnold Foundation to Continue Data-Driven Criminal Justice
Effort Launched under the Obama Administration (Laura and John Arnold
Foundation, Jan 23, 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/Q887-2LXV. The foundation
pledged to “dramatically expand[ ] its efforts to use data and analytics in order to address challenges in the criminal justice system” and explained that two former White
House advisors who played key roles in Obama’s initiative had joined the foundation
to continue their work. Id.
24 See Wiseman, 84 Geo Wash L Rev at 420 (cited in note 15) (documenting a
drop-off in bail-related scholarship after United States v Salerno but noting a recent
resurgence of interest). See also, for example, Shima Baradaran and Frank L.
McIntyre, Predicting Violence, 90 Tex L Rev 497, 507–13 (2012) (analyzing factors relevant to pretrial “dangerousness” predictions); Shima Baradaran, Restoring the
Presumption of Innocence, 72 Ohio St L J 723, 738–39 (2011) (tracing the erosion of
the pretrial presumption of innocence).
25 See Wiseman, 84 Geo Wash L Rev at 421 (cited in note 15) (“Flight risk—the
other chief factor in bail decisionmaking—has been largely ignored.”).
26 See, for example, id at 442–46 (using flight risk and nonappearance interchangeably); Baradaran and McIntyre, 90 Tex L Rev at 545–48 (cited in note 24) (generally describing all nonappearance risks as “flight risk”). Criminologists supply additional ambiguity, using the term “fugitive” in similarly inconsistent ways. See Part I.A.
27 See Part II.C (analyzing cases and highlighting references to both flight and
nonappearance).
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coextensive. Flight risk is properly assigned to defendants who
are expected to flee a jurisdiction. This is a small, and arguably
shrinking,29 subcategory of a much larger group of defendants
who pose risks of nonappearance.30
This Article calls for nuance in the definition of
nonappearance and flight, both in actuarial risk-assessment
tools and in bail reform efforts more broadly. Constitutional and
statutory requirements demand precision about these distinctions. In other work, I have asserted that disentangling flight
risk and nonappearance from dangerousness will be essential to
successful bail reform.31 This Article builds on that contention by
isolating the appearance-related pretrial risks that judges seek
to measure and manage and then highlighting fundamental
problems with the definition of those risks.
Clarifying these muddy risk descriptions requires taking a
step back to delineate the harms posed by various forms of nonappearance. This Article proposes dividing the broad category of
“nonappearing defendants” (or defendants who fail to appear)
into three subcategories. The first subcategory of true flight
comprises defendants who flee the jurisdiction. The other two
subcategories are both local or nonflight forms of nonappearance: defendants who remain in the jurisdiction but actively and
persistently avoid court, described as local absconders, and defendants who remain in the jurisdiction but whose failures to
appear are more preventable in advance and less costly after the
fact, termed low-cost nonappearances. These subcategories differ
in nature and not merely by degree.32 Defendants in these subcategories impose distinct systemic costs and call for different
types of supervision and management. The distinctions between
these groups turn on the intent of the actor, the persistence of
the nonappearance, the difficulty (for the jurisdiction) of locating
28 See Part II.B (reviewing discussions of flight and nonappearance in federal and
state statutes).
29 Samuel R. Wiseman, Pretrial Detention and the Right to Be Monitored, 123 Yale
L J 1344, 1352–53 (2014) (explaining that technological advances make fleeing less effective in avoiding trial).
30 In this Article, “nonappearance risk” is used interchangeably with the risk that a
defendant will “fail to appear.”
31 See generally Gouldin, 2016 BYU L Rev 837 (cited in note 16).
32 Risk-assessment tools place defendants into tiers of nonappearance risk (generally ranking them), but scaling nonappearance risk does not account for the differences
between the categories. See Part III.B (describing the operation of risk-assessment
tools). For example, someone who poses a very high risk of nonappearance is not the
same as someone who poses a true flight risk.
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him or her, and the specific types of pretrial interventions that
might be appropriate to ensure appearance.33
Ideally, risk-assessment tools would help judges identify
which defendants are likely to fall into these subcategories. Unfortunately, the tools currently available do not define, measure,
or guide judges about how to manage these separate risks. Instead, current risk-assessment tools treat all nonappearances
equally and produce risk numbers that do not adequately account for a court’s ability to manage and mitigate pretrial flight
and nonappearance risk.34 Although current reform efforts are
focused on identifying less intrusive and lower-cost interventions that can effectively manage pretrial risks, those efforts (including, in particular, the risk-assessment tools that have been
developed) are hobbled by vague and overly general descriptions
of nonappearance risk. A more nuanced understanding of these
differences will be a key piece of broader efforts to reduce judicial reliance on pretrial detention and to mitigate the risks
posed by defendants on release. Ensuring that practitioners and
judges have a greater appreciation for these distinctions may also improve outcomes in individual cases.
This Article proceeds as follows: Part I outlines the problem
of pretrial nonappearance, detailing the inconsistent descriptions of the problem, highlighting data deficits, and outlining
costs. This Part also highlights the connection between pretrial
nonappearance and the overwhelming backlogs of outstanding
warrants (many of which are bench warrants for failures to appear for court) in jurisdictions across the country. Part II
analyzes the governing legal framework, including constitutional protections against excessive pretrial restraint, federal and
state statutory requirements that govern pretrial assessments of
flight and other nonappearance risks, and judicial decisions applying those statutes. Part III evaluates how modern riskassessment tools fit into broader reform efforts, how those tools
predict nonappearance, and why they define and predict nonappearance only in vague and overly general terms.
Finally, Part IV outlines a new nonappearance taxonomy
that divides the broad category of nonappearance into the three
separate subcategories mentioned above: those who flee the jurisdiction, local absconders, and low-cost local nonappearances.

33
34

See Part IV.
See Part III.B.
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At least some judges making pretrial-detention decisions have
implicitly drawn some of these distinctions between true flight
risk and other nonappearance risks, but an explicit and detailed
account of these distinctions is overdue. Part IV closes by summarizing how this taxonomy advances the larger objective: identifying less intrusive and lower-cost interventions than those
currently used in most jurisdictions, which can more efficiently
and fairly manage the full range of nonappearance and flight
risks.
I. FUGITIVES, FLIGHT, AND NONAPPEARANCE: DEFINING
PROBLEMS AND RISKS
For centuries, judges have understood that—in order to
guarantee that justice is administered and to promote efficiency
in the process—they must ensure that criminal defendants will
appear for future court appearances.35 Despite this long history,
little attention has been devoted to defining flight risk and to
distinguishing flight from other types of nonappearance.36
More-rigorous thinking about nonappearance is essential for
several reasons. First, although concerns about predicting future
offending behavior understandably dominate the current reform
conversation, stakeholders also clearly care about the costs of
nonappearance: a defendant’s history of nonappearance weighs
heavily in actuarial risk calculations.37 Second, as release rates
rise with the implementation of reform, rates of nonappearance
will also rise. The sustainability of reform depends on maintaining acceptable appearance rates. Finally, as outlined in more detail in Part IV.C, efforts to better define the nature and causes
of various forms of nonappearance force engagement with other
fundamental questions about the criminal justice system, including questions about what we criminalize and who we arrest.

35 See Stack v Boyle, 342 US 1, 5 n 3 (1951) (explaining that bail should be set to
“insure the presence of the defendant”). See also Laura I. Appleman, Justice in the
Shadowlands: Pretrial Detention, Punishment, & the Sixth Amendment, 69 Wash & Lee
L Rev 1297, 1335 (2012) (“[A]lthough the specific intent of the Framers regarding bail
cannot be conclusively determined, all the available evidence points to the fact that pretrial detention, both under English common law and at the time the Constitution was
written, was limited to flight risks.”).
36 See notes 24–25 and accompanying text.
37 See, for example, Wiseman, 84 Geo Wash L Rev at 451 (cited in note 15) (discussing Virginia’s pretrial risk-assessment tool, which considers whether the defendant has
two or more FTAs, among other factors).
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This Part contributes to the pretrial-release literature by
identifying: (i) the mix of terms that are currently used (inconsistently) to describe various sorts of nonappearance problems;
(ii) the data that are available about the scope of the problem of
nonappearance; and (iii) the general costs of various forms of
nonappearance, both for the system and for nonappearing defendants, their families, and their communities.
A.

Misdescribing the Problem(s)

Legislators, judges, scholars, and reformers define and describe the risk that a defendant will not appear for future court
appearances in different and inconsistent ways. To some extent, the different terminologies acknowledge that some nonappearances are more problematic than others; for example, a
defendant who flees the jurisdiction is more costly to recover
than one who fails to appear but stays local. Put in risk terms,
then, a flight risk should be more serious than a nonflight risk.
Statutes frequently direct judges to predict whether a defendant will “appear” and to set release conditions that will ensure appearance.38 The federal statute and some state statutes
refer to both flight risk and other forms of nonappearance risk,
drawing at least an implicit distinction.39 Although several
38 See, for example, 18 USC § 3142(c) (instructing federal judges to impose conditions of release that will “reasonably assure the appearance” of a defendant released pretrial); Cal Penal Code § 1275(a)(1):

In setting, reducing, or denying bail, a judge or magistrate shall take into consideration the protection of the public, the seriousness of the offense charged,
the previous criminal record of the defendant, and the probability of his or her
appearing at trial or at a hearing of the case. The public safety shall be the
primary consideration.
See also, for example, Tenn Code Ann § 40-11-115(b) (“In determining whether or not a
person shall be released . . . the magistrate shall take into account: . . . (8) Any other factors indicating the defendant’s ties to the community or bearing on the risk of willful
failure to appear.”); Ind Code § 35-33-8-3.2(a):
[A] court may admit a defendant to bail and impose any of the following conditions to assure the defendant’s appearance at any stage of the legal proceedings, or . . . (7) [r]elease the defendant on personal recognizance unless:
(A) the state presents evidence relevant to a risk by the defendant: (i) of nonappearance . . . and (B) the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that
the risk exists.
39 See 18 USC § 3142(g)(3)(A) (instructing judicial officers to take into account the
defendant’s “family ties, employment, financial resources, length of residence in the
community, [and] community ties” as well as the defendant’s “record concerning appearance at court proceedings,” among other characteristics). See also, for example, NY Crim
Proc Law § 510.30(2)(a) (outlining that a court evaluating “the kind and degree of control
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statutes highlight flight as a more “serious” problem, they provide no definitions.40 Most state statutes, like the federal
statute, set out factors for judges to consider in evaluating
nonappearance risk but do not identify which factors are specifically relevant to flight and which are relevant to other local (or
nonflight) types of nonappearance.41
Yet judges making bail determinations use the term “flight
risk” to refer to all nonappearance risks, whether or not the individual is actually likely to flee the jurisdiction.42 Scholars and
reformers do the same.43 In contrast, the new risk-assessment
tools that aid judges making risk calculations use “appearance”
language but do not mention or measure flight risk.44 But using
either “flight” or “failure to appear” (FTA) so expansively elides
significant distinctions between true flight, local absconding,
and low-cost forms of nonappearance that are discussed in
Part IV.
Empirical studies of nonappearance introduce still more inconsistent terminologies, including, for example, frequent references to “fugitives.”45 Sometimes, the term “fugitive” is used, in
keeping perhaps with more colloquial understandings, to identify an individual who has left the jurisdiction.46 At other times,
being a fugitive is not contingent on any spatial or geographical
movement. Instead, it turns on the passage of time: for instance,
a fugitive may be someone who has failed to appear for more

or restriction that is necessary to secure [a defendant’s] court attendance when required
. . . must . . . consider and take into account” a defendant’s “previous record if any in responding to court appearances when required or with respect to flight to avoid criminal
prosecution”); Fla Stat § 903.046(2) (explaining that in setting bail or conditions of release courts “shall consider,” among other things, “[t]he defendant’s past and present
conduct, including any record of convictions, previous flight to avoid prosecution, or failure to appear at court proceedings”).
40 See, for example, 18 USC § 3142(f)(2)(A); 18 USC § 3142(b) (failing to define
what it means that a release would not “reasonably assure the appearance of the person
as required”).
41 See 18 USC § 3142(g). See also note 39.
42 See Part II.C.
43 See note 26.
44 See Part III.B.
45 See, for example, Thomas H. Cohen and Brian A. Reaves, Pretrial Release of
Felony Defendants in State Courts *8–10 (Bureau of Justice Statistics, Nov 2007), archived at http://perma.cc/6C8R-WSVU; John S. Goldkamp, Fugitive Safe Surrender: An
Important Beginning, 11 Crimin & Pub Pol 429, 429–30 (2012).
46 See, for example, 18 USC § 1073. The federal fugitive statute targets a fugitive
that “moves or travels in interstate or foreign commerce” with the intent to avoid prosecution or arrest. 18 USC § 1073.
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than one year.47 Although an imperfect proxy, this temporal distinction may reflect the intention or willfulness one might associate with a fugitive. Intention or willfulness, however, is not a
universally accepted aspect of the definition of a “fugitive”—
there are references elsewhere in the literature to “inadvertent”
and “unintentional” fugitives.48 Nor is the label “fugitive” reserved for those who are actively sought by the government.49
Terminology, however, is only part of the problem. Even
when labels are agreed on, there are major issues with the accuracy and significance of the data that are collected about nonappearances. What does it mean to have an FTA on your record?
Different jurisdictions apply different standards for measuring
and recording what qualifies as an FTA or nonappearance. In a
2011 Pretrial Justice Institute report, Cynthia Mamalian documented the inconsistencies:
In some jurisdictions, if the defendant fails to appear for
court, he is immediately assigned a[n] FTA status. In other
jurisdictions, if the defendant fails to appear, the family is
called, the defendant is given another chance, and the defendant’s case is only considered a[n] FTA if a warrant is ultimately issued.50
If a defendant has an FTA on his record, that will have a
significant impact on whether he will be released before trial

47 In Bureau of Justice Statistics reports that use data from the State Court
Processing Statistics program, defendants are deemed “fugitives” if they do not return to
court within a year “irrespective if they remained in the local jurisdiction or fled to a different state [or] county.” Thomas H. Cohen, Administrative Office of the US Courts,
Office of Probation & Pretrial Services, Email to Lauryn P. Gouldin, Syracuse University
College of Law (Jan 24, 2017) (“Cohen Email”) (on file with author). See also Cohen and
Reaves, Pretrial Release of Felony Defendants in State Courts at *8–10 (cited in note 45)
(discussing fugitive status for purposes of pretrial release).
48 Goldkamp, 11 Crimin & Pub Pol at 430 (cited in note 45) (discussing the
phenomenon of “inadvertent fugitives”); David M. Bierie, National Public Registry of
Active-Warrants: A Policy Proposal, 79 Fed Probation 27, 27–28 (2015) (describing defendants who are unaware of outstanding warrants as “unintentional fugitives”).
49 Professor Alice Goffman notes that, at least in some communities, residents tend
to “draw . . . distinctions between those likely to be taken into custody if the authorities
do a general sweep, and those for whom the authorities are aggressively searching.”
Alice Goffman, On the Run: Fugitive Life in an American City 7 (Chicago 2014).
50 Cynthia A. Mamalian, State of the Science of Pretrial Risk Assessment *27
(Pretrial Justice Institute, Mar 2011), archived at http://perma.cc/Y9HF-QCZZ, citing
Pretrial Justice Institute, Pretrial Justice in America: A Survey of County Pretrial
Release
Policies,
Practices
and
Outcomes
*10
(2010),
archived
at
http://perma.cc/37AB-68ZN.
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and what conditions may be imposed if he is released.51 Prior
FTAs have always been significant to judges as part of a mix of
factors that might predict the likelihood of flight or other forms
of nonappearance.52 In the risk-assessment tools that are increasingly being used across the country, prior FTAs are displacing other factors, becoming the primary determinant of a defendant’s nonappearance risk score.53
B.

Data: How Many Missing Defendants?

Notwithstanding the ambiguity in terminology, some facts
are evident from the available data. Estimates for the numbers
of felony defendants who fail to appear for scheduled court appearances vary, but data from 2009 indicate that the vast majority (83 percent) of felony defendants who are released before trial appear for all scheduled court appearances.54 The remaining
17 percent missed at least one scheduled court appearance, with
13 percent (of the total number) returning to court within one
year.55 Only 3 percent of all released felony defendants remained
a “fugitive” after a year.56 These numbers represent a significant
decline compared to earlier studies; in 1996, nearly one-fourth of
all felony defendants had at least one nonappearance.57

51 See Part II.C.4.a (highlighting the significance of prior nonappearance in both
statutes and risk-assessment tools); Part III.B (same).
52 See Part II.C (reviewing factors specified in state and federal statutes that judges use to predict nonappearance risk).
53 See Part III.B.2 (describing the emphasis in modern tools on prior FTAs).
54 Brian A. Reaves, Felony Defendants in Large Urban Counties, 2009—Statistical
Tables *21 (Bureau of Justice Statistics, Dec 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/U4RC
-4WER. Reaves indicates that “[d]ata on the court appearance record and fugitive status
were available for 95.1% of cases involving a defendant released prior to disposition.” Id.
Other, older studies estimate rates of nonappearance as high as one-third for felony defendants. Daniel J. Flannery and Jeff M. Kretschmar, Fugitive Safe Surrender: Program
Description, Initial Findings, and Policy Implications, 11 Crimin & Pub Pol 437, 453
(2012) (citing a 1999 study of New York City bench warrants). FTA rates also vary by “jurisdiction and offense type.” Brian H. Bornstein, et al, Reducing Courts’ Failure-to-Appear
Rate by Written Reminders, 19 Psychology, Pub Pol & L 70, 70 (2013).
55 Reaves, Felony Defendants in Large Urban Counties at *21 (cited in note 54).
56 Id (explaining that the “detail” (13 and 3 percent) may not add up to the total
(17 percent) because of rounding). See also id (“All defendants who failed to appear in
court and were not returned to the court during the 1-year study period were counted
as fugitives.”).
57 Id at *15 (observing that the 2009 data was roughly equivalent to 2006 percentages “but lower than the 24% rate observed prior to 1996”). See also Eric Helland and
Alexander Tabarrok, The Fugitive: Evidence on Public versus Private Law Enforcement
from Bail Jumping, 47 J L & Econ 93, 109 (2004).
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Nonappearance rates for those charged with lower-level felonies and misdemeanors are typically higher than for defendants charged with higher-level felonies.58 In 2009, for example,
“failure-to-appear rates were lowest for murder (5%) and rape
(7%) defendants, and highest for those released after being
charged with motor vehicle theft (28%).”59
Over time and in jurisdictions across the country, pretrial
nonappearance rates have created significant backlogs of outstanding warrants.60 Bench warrants for defendants who fail to
appear for court “often represent a large proportion of a jurisdiction’s open warrants.”61
Although data about open warrants are imperfect,62 they
provide some perspective on the phenomenon of nonappearance.
Information from the National Crime Information Center
(NCIC) Wanted Person file indicates that on any given day in
the United States, there are “over two million active criminal
warrants.”63 In her 2016 dissent in Utah v Strieff,64 in which she
observed that “[o]utstanding warrants are surprisingly common,”65 Justice Sonia Sotomayor cited state warrant data putting the total number of outstanding warrants much higher, at
58 Bornstein, et al, 19 Psychology, Pub Pol & L at 70 (cited in note 54); Meagan
Cahill, Focusing on the Individual in Warrant-Clearing Efforts, 11 Crimin & Pub Pol
473, 478 (2012).
59 Reaves, Felony Defendants in Large Urban Counties at *15 (cited in note 54).
60 See Cahill, 11 Crimin & Pub Pol at 478 (cited in note 58) (“The failure-to-appear
problem cannot be overlooked in any effort to address a jurisdiction’s warrant backlog.”).
See also Kenneth Howe and Erin Hallissy, When Justice Goes Unserved: Thousands
Wanted on Outstanding Warrants—but Law Enforcement Largely Ignores Them (SF
Gate, June 22, 1999), archived at http://perma.cc/PTA7-R5GS (describing the backlog in
California as of 1999 of “more than 2.5 million unserved warrants” and explaining that
bench warrants for suspects who “failed to appear for their court dates” have “caused the
number of warrants to balloon”). Warrant backlogs include warrants for other “wanted
persons” including complaint and indictment warrants for suspects who have not yet
been arrested, parole violation warrants, warrants for other individuals who have escaped from government custody, and criminal summonses, among others. Greg Hager, et
al, Improved Coordination and Information Could Reduce the Backlog of Unserved
Warrants *4–7 (Kentucky Legislative Research Commission Research Report No 326,
July 14, 2005), archived at http://perma.cc/STE4-U2HJ.
61 Cahill, 11 Crimin & Pub Pol at 478 (cited in note 58).
62 Flannery and Kretschmar, 11 Crimin & Pub Pol at 437 (cited in note 54) (“The
exact number of outstanding felony and misdemeanor warrants in local jurisdictions is
unknown.”).
63 Bierie, 79 Fed Probation at 27 (cited in note 48). See also David M. Bierie,
Fugitives in the United States, 42 J Crim Just 327, 330 (2014) (“The data showed there
were a total of 1.95 million active warrants in NCIC [in April 2011].”).
64 136 S Ct 2056 (2016).
65 Id at 2068 (Sotomayor dissenting).
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over 7.8 million.66 The discrepancy is partially driven by the fact
that the state data include more misdemeanors and other types
of warrants (including civil, traffic, and juvenile warrants) that
are not included in the NCIC Wanted Person file.67
The bulk of the warrant backlog is for low-level offenses.
Only 725,000 of the 7.8 million records cited by Sotomayor are
for felonies68 and only 100,000 of those involve “serious violent
crime.”69 Researchers have established that in some jurisdictions, up to 75 percent of warrants for FTA are for traffic offenses.70 Close examination of warrant backlogs in jurisdictions like
Ferguson, Missouri, raise real questions about the incentives to
generate warrants and how overuse of warrants affects communities.71 In Ferguson, the Department of Justice found that sixteen thousand people in a population of twenty-one thousand—
more than 76 percent—had outstanding warrants, most for traffic offenses or other municipal-ordinance violations.72
Disproportionately large numbers of outstanding warrants
for low-level offenses and infractions clearly reflect systemic dysfunction. Without more information about the front-end processes for generating bench warrants or the back-end processes for
resolving them, warrant backlog data provide little in the way of
illumination about whether nonappearance is the problem or the
product of other problems, such as overcriminalization, the
66 Id at 2066 (Sotomayor dissenting) (rejecting the majority’s holding that the discovery of an outstanding warrant served as an “intervening circumstance” between the
clearly unlawful stop of Edward Strieff and the search that followed his subsequent arrest), citing US Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Survey of State
Criminal History Information Systems, 2014 *38 (Dec 2015), archived at
http://perma.cc/C45D-W83Y (Table 5a).
67 Survey of State Criminal History Information Systems, 2014 at *38 (cited in note
66) (Table 5a).
68 Id.
69 Bierie, 79 Fed Probation at 27 (cited in note 48). See also Rachel A. Harmon,
Why Arrest?, 115 Mich L Rev 307, 348 (2016) (arguing that summonses could replace arrest warrants even for those accused of committing serious violent felonies).
70 Bierie, 42 J Crim Just at 328 (cited in note 63):

[A prior study] examined one year’s worth of warrants in local crime databases of two counties and found that court violations (e.g., failure to appear)
accounted for just over half of warrants present. They also found that approximately 75% of those court violations were for traffic offenses. However,
there is no larger research to date describing warrants across crime types or
other categorizations.
71 US Department of Justice, Investigation of the Ferguson Police Department *55
(Mar 4, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/U367-SFSQ (“Ferguson’s municipal court issues arrest warrants at a rate that police officials have called . . . ‘staggering.’”).
72 Id at *6, 55.
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poverty of arrestees, or the difficulty of navigating the
cumbersome pretrial process.73 The problems with existing data reinforce this Article’s central claim: putting all types of
nonappearance and all bench warrants in the same bucket
muddies these waters, making solutions harder to find and
potentially obscuring the government’s contribution to the
problem.
Concerns about the numbers of outstanding warrants and
at-large fugitives are not new. The US Senate held hearings and
issued a report on the national fugitive problem in 2000.74 But
little has been done to measure and document the problem, let
alone to resolve it, since.75 As Professor David Bierie has explained, “[m]ore than a decade later,” the problem is “essentially
unchanged, with scholars lamenting ‘how little is known about
the fugitive phenomenon—including attributes as simple as the
actual volume of fugitives either per year or currently active in
all justice systems in the United States.’” 76 By bringing attention
to the critical—but previously unexamined—definitional problems that must be addressed as prerequisites for successful
analysis and reform, this Article provides the necessary foundation for successful reforms and includes a preliminary research
agenda to address these significant data deficits.
C.

The Costs of Nonappearance and Flight

Before moving into the legal framework that governs the
pretrial process, we should translate some of these observations
about the scale of the pretrial nonappearance problem into
thoughts about costs.77 This Section addresses systemic costs,
then shifts to the costs and impacts on nonappearing

73 Recent efforts to reform the summons process in New York City reflect awareness that both the overall volume of summonses and the complexity of the summons process contribute to high rates of nonappearance. See Summons Reform (Mayor’s Office of
Criminal Justice), archived at http://perma.cc/JF4H-VC2B (“Nearly four in ten summonses issued resulted in a warrant for failure to appear in court, which may affect the
likelihood of future detention.”).
74 See generally Fugitives: The Chronic Threat to Safety, Law, and Order, Hearing
before the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice Oversight of the Committee on the Judiciary
of the Senate, 106th Cong, 2d Sess (2000) (“Senate Hearings on Fugitives”).
75 Bierie, 42 J Crim Just at 328 (cited in note 63).
76 Id, quoting Goldkamp, 11 Crimin & Pub Pol at 430 (cited in note 45).
77 See Parts IV.A–B (proposing a new taxonomy of nonappearance and flight and
considering the costs of various types of nonappearance).
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defendants, and finally identifies some ways that current practices are counterproductive.
Defendants who fail to appear for court impose costs on the
system that are traditionally described in broad, sweeping
terms. Across jurisdictions, the government has “a substantial
interest in ensuring that persons accused of crimes are available
for trials.”78 For more serious crimes, the interest is more compelling.79 Evading justice is described as an affront to every purpose of punishment:
A fugitive’s flight erodes the deterrent effect of sanctions by
lowering the probability of catching the offender and by reducing the present value of punishment. Fugitive flight delays incapacitation, because criminals “on the lam” enjoy
the opportunity to commit additional offenses. Their flight
also denies society the opportunity to exact retribution for
the offender’s crime.80
The judiciary has a related institutional interest in “safeguarding the integrity of the adjudication process.”81 High volumes of nonappearances may suggest to the public
that the courts are dysfunctional and unable to deliver justice—to victims or defendants. In short, a court system that
cannot ensure that defendants will refrain from crime, attend court as required, and protect victims, witnesses, or jurors has difficulty protecting the integrity of the judicial
process and ultimately its legitimacy.82

78 Bell v Wolfish, 441 US 520, 534 (1979) (“[T]he Government has a substantial interest in ensuring that persons accused of crimes are available for trials and, ultimately,
for service of their sentences, [and] confinement of such persons pending trial is a legitimate means of furthering that interest.”).
79 See Goldkamp and Vîlcică, Judicial Discretion and the Unfinished Agenda of
American Bail Reform at 131–32 (cited in note 15) (describing judges’ views that the
seriousness of the charge is tied to the cost of “mistakes that could be made in making
release decisions”).
80 Thomas J. Miles, Estimating the Effect of America’s Most Wanted: A
Duration Analysis of Wanted Fugitives, 48 J L & Econ 281, 281 (2005). Premised on
the evasion of justice, Professor Thomas J. Miles’s analysis here assumes the guilt of
the fugitive. See id.
81 E. Rely Vîlcică and John S. Goldkamp, Bail Prediction: Exploring the Role of
Neighborhood Context in Philadelphia, 42 Crim Just & Behav 1159, 1161 (2015).
82 Id. See also Goldkamp, 11 Crimin & Pub Pol at 430 (cited in note 45) (“[T]he fugitive problem . . . has great significance for deterrence and the courts. The numbers of
those intentionally avoiding court demonstrate the weakness in any intended deterrent
message from the courts.”).
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The costs imposed on the system by nonappearing defendants, however, vary with the nonappearance’s nature and persistence. Those who flee the jurisdiction impose different costs
than those who remain in the jurisdiction.83 And persistent nonappearances are more costly than short-term nonappearances.84
The costs of managing nonappearance risks (that is, of preventing nonappearance) also vary. These differences drive this Article’s proposed division of nonappearance into subcategories, as
discussed below.85
The final set of costs is the impacts on nonappearing defendants and their families and communities.86 Defendants with
outstanding warrants may avoid “secur[ing] legitimate and stable employment” because of the fear of detection and arrest.87
They will also “have difficulty obtaining a driver’s license, [and]
cannot legally obtain public benefits.”88
Criminologists also describe the direct impacts of outstanding bench warrants on a defendant’s physical and mental well
being.89 In On the Run, her ethnography of life with the “Sixth
Street Boys” in Philadelphia, Professor Alice Goffman details
the cumulative impacts on the young men she observes of “dipping and dodging” to avoid police and outstanding warrants.90 As
Goffman explains, in addition to closing off opportunities for education and legitimate employment, this is a lifestyle that severely strains relationships with friends and family.91
83

See Part IV.A (defining “true flight risks”).
See Part IV.B.2.b (analyzing the significance of the persistence or duration of
nonappearance).
85 See Part IV.
86 Of course, from the defendant’s perspective, these costs may pale in comparison
to the costs of showing up, which may include getting convicted, being sentenced, and
being deported.
87 Cahill, 11 Crimin & Pub Pol at 476 (cited in note 58) (“Outstanding warrants . . .
[may] lead to additional illegal actions by cutting off individuals from legitimate sources
of income or activity or by making them potential victims who are less likely to report
their victimization to authorities for fear of the risk to themselves.”). See also Goffman,
On the Run at 52 (cited in note 49) (“[A man on the run] doesn’t show up at the hospital
when his child is born, nor does he seek medical help when he is badly beaten. He
doesn’t seek formal employment. . . . He avoids calling the police when harmed or using
the courts to settle disputes.”).
88 Flannery and Kretschmar, 11 Crimin & Pub Pol at 439 (cited in note 54).
89 Cahill, 11 Crimin & Pub Pol at 476 (cited in note 58) (“Having an outstanding
warrant (or even simply believing that one has a warrant) can cause significant levels of
individual- and family-level stress.”).
90 Goffman, On the Run at 6, 186 (cited in note 49).
91 Id at 52–53. See also Flannery and Kretschmar, 11 Crimin & Pub Pol at 439 (cited in note 54) (“The threat of going to jail can affect their close relationships and weaken
84
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In one study of a years-long project (Fugitive Safe
Surrender) to try to clear outstanding warrants and bring defendants back into the justice system, researchers surveyed defendants about why they turned themselves in voluntarily. The
responses highlight many of the points made above:
The most common reason cited for why individuals surrendered voluntarily was because they “want to get their driver’s license,” as noted by nearly half of all respondents
(47.1%), followed by “want to start over” (41.8%) and “fear of
arrest” (39.4%). The next most common reasons for surrendering were “for my kids” (33.6%), “want to get a job” (33%),
and “tired of running” (29.1%). Asked why they had not surrendered before today, nearly 60% said they did not have
money to pay bail or fines, but others noted being afraid: “I
was afraid of what would happen to me” (36.5%) and “I
didn’t want to go to jail” (37.2%) or “I didn’t want to get
arrested” (28%).92
These impacts on defendants translate into new community problems. Fear of additional punishment for failing to appear, including fees and fines, reinforces a defendant’s desire
or need to avoid court.93 Even initially inadvertent
nonappearances can quickly become a persistent phenomenon.
When nonappearances become persistent, those defendants risk
becoming modern “outlaws,” persons who have been “put outside
the sphere of legal protection,” and for whom “crime becomes a
natural source of income.”94 This, in turn, creates a criminogenic
environment in the community “through a sort of cyclical regeneration of noncompliant individuals at the core of a criminal culture of
resistance and disrespect.”95 Professor Alexander Tabarrok

already tenuous attachments to family, work, and community.”); Alexander Tabarrok,
Fugitives, Outlaws, and the Lessons of Safe Surrender, 11 Crimin & Pub Pol 461, 464
(2012) (“Asociality, secrecy, and unpredictability become strategies to maintain liberty.”).
92 Flannery and Kretschmar, 11 Crimin & Pub Pol at 449 (cited in note 54).
93 Goldkamp, 11 Crimin & Pub Pol at 429–30 (cited in note 45) (“Some [defendants]
. . . simply cannot afford financially to turn themselves in.”). See also Alicia Bannon,
Mitali Nagrecha, and Rebekah Diller, Criminal Justice Debt: A Barrier to Reentry *13
(Brennan Center for Justice, 2010), archived at http://perma.cc/44VV-LMJH (“[U]npaid
criminal justice debt puts individuals at risk of imprisonment and can impact everything
from their employment and housing opportunities, to their financial stability, to their
right to vote.”).
94 Tabarrok, 11 Crimin & Pub Pol at 462–63 (cited in note 91).
95 Goldkamp, 11 Crimin & Pub Pol at 429–30 (cited in note 45) (describing this as a
form of “deterrence ‘backfire’”).
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explains that “the logic that encourages asociality and discourages work, school, routine, and any interaction with the justice
system [ ] pushes outlaws away from civil society when we most
want logic to push them toward civil society.”96
Taken together, the data about nonappearances and bench
warrant backlogs, and the discussion of the costs of
nonappearances, reveal serious pathologies in the current system. These problems relate to how FTAs are logged, what they
mean, and how they impact the future behavior of defendants.
As outlined below, reforms that build on the existing system
without addressing the cracks in this foundation are doomed to
repeat current mistakes.
II. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK
Ambiguity in the description and definition of
nonappearance risks violates both constitutional and statutory
provisions, which require a match between the means and ends
of any pretrial restraint on liberty. The Constitution prohibits
judges from imposing “excessive” restraints on liberty before trial,97 and federal and state statutes similarly limit judges to imposing the “least restrictive” set of conditions that are necessary
to manage risks of nonappearance.98 Employing vague, overly
general risk descriptions significantly increases the likelihood of
unconstitutional and costly overregulation. The government
needs to know the risks it is regulating in order to abide by constitutional and statutory requirements.
A.

The Constitutional Mandate

A judge’s pretrial evaluation of nonappearance risk includes
at least two steps. First, the judge evaluates whether a defendant poses risks of flight or other forms of nonappearance. The
judge is then empowered by federal and state bail statutes to
impose conditions of release (if necessary) to manage these risks.
In extreme cases, judges can detain defendants who pose otherwise unmanageable risks.99
96

Tabarrok, 11 Crimin & Pub Pol at 464 (cited in note 91).
See Part II.A.
98 See Part II.B.
99 If the judge is unable to manage the risk of nonappearance using conditions of
release, detention may be warranted. For example, as Professor Samuel R. Wiseman has
observed, “No matter how ingenious the [electronic monitoring] technology, it is likely
that highly motivated defendants will find a way to defeat it, perhaps by damaging or
97
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Judges traditionally managed flight and other forms of nonappearance risk by imposing financial conditions of release, also
called money bail.100 When money bail is imposed, a defendant or
his sureties are required to put up money or property to obtain
the defendant’s release from custody; the money or property is
returned if the defendant successfully appears for subsequent
court proceedings.101 This use of bail as an incentive to appear
traces its roots to the colonial era.102
Problems with judicial discretion in setting bail—and specifically with the imposition of “excessive bail”—are centuries old.
The British Habeas Corpus Act of 1679103 established some protections around bail but left the amount of bail to the “discretions” of the magistrate.104 This created immediate problems:
judges could ensure defendants’ detention “by deliberately setting bail so high that the defendants could not pay.”105 The

removing the tracking device or by blocking its signal.” Wiseman, 123 Yale L J at 1371
(cited in note 29). These “highly motivated defendants” would qualify as the sort of “extreme cases” cited in the text. Wiseman speculates, however, that under current practices in many jurisdictions, these defendants may already be at risk of being detained for
dangerousness. Id.
100 See Timothy R. Schnacke, Fundamentals of Bail: A Resource Guide for Pretrial
Practitioners and a Framework for American Pretrial Reform *2 (National Institute of
Corrections, Aug 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/P4EL-XEP8 (“‘[B]ail’ [refers to] a
process of releasing a defendant from jail . . . with [financial or nonfinancial] conditions
set to provide reasonable assurance of court appearance or public safety.”).
101 Gouldin, 2016 BYU L Rev at 856 n 80 (cited in note 16).
102 The origins of bail can be traced back to medieval England, where bail in its earliest forms was set to approximate the debt that a defendant might owe to a victim at the
resolution of a case. See Schnacke, Fundamentals of Bail at *26–28 (cited in note 100).
See also Clara Kalhous and John Meringolo, Bail Pending Trial: Changing
Interpretations of the Bail Reform Act and the Importance of Bail from Defense Attorneys’
Perspectives, 32 Pace L Rev 800, 803 (2012) (“Because the amount of the pledge was
equal to the potential penalty upon conviction, the ‘system necessarily linked the amount
of the pretrial pledge to the seriousness of the crime.’”), quoting June Carbone, Seeing
through the Emperor’s New Clothes: Rediscovery of Basic Principles in the
Administration of Bail, 34 Syracuse L Rev 517, 520 (1983). In the United States, however, bail has always been described as an incentive (and not as any sort of prepayment or
approximation of liability). Schnacke, Fundamentals of Bail at *40 (cited in note 100).
103 Habeas Corpus Act of 1679, 31 Car II ch 2, reprinted in 5 Statutes of the
Realm 935 (1819).
104 Habeas Corpus Act of 1679, 31 Car II ch 2, reprinted in 5 Statutes of the Realm
at 935 (cited in note 103).
105 Samuel Wiseman, Discrimination, Coercion, and the Bail Reform Act of 1984:
The Loss of the Core Constitutional Protections of the Excessive Bail Clause, 36 Fordham
Urban L J 121, 127 (2009). See also Hermine Herta Meyer, Constitutionality of Pretrial
Detention, 60 Georgetown L J 1139, 1189 (1972) (“By imposing excessive bail, the judges
had made the Habeas Corpus Act inoperative with respect to those prisoners whom the
King did not want to release.”).
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English Bill of Rights of 1689106 addressed this pretextual use of
bail by prohibiting “excessive bail.”107 The language from the
English Bill of Rights became a model for the Eighth
Amendment to the US Constitution, drafted a century later,
which states: “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”108
As Professor Samuel Wiseman has explained, we do not know
much about the Framers’ intent regarding the term “excessive”:
The only known remark addressing the proposed Excessive
Bail Clause came from Mr. Livermore in the House of
Representatives as part of a comment on the Eighth
Amendment as a whole . . . . “The clause seems to express a
great deal of humanity, on which account I have no objection to it; but as it seems to have no meaning in it, I do not
think it necessary. What is meant by the terms excessive
bail? Who are to be the judges?” 109
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has given the Excessive
Bail Clause very little attention; to date, it has provided only
modest protection against pretrial detention.110 The Supreme
Court first addressed the definition of “excessive” in Stack v
Boyle,111 decided in 1951. As the Stack court explained:
Like the ancient practice of securing the oaths of responsible persons to stand as sureties for the accused, the modern
practice of requiring a bail bond or the deposit of a sum of
money subject to forfeiture serves as additional assurance of
the presence of an accused. Bail set at a figure higher than

106 English Bill of Rights of 1689, 1 Wm & Mary sess 2, ch 2, reprinted in 6 Statutes
of the Realm 142 (1819).
107 English Bill of Rights of 1689, 1 Wm & Mary sess 2, ch 2, reprinted in 6 Statutes
of the Realm at 143 (cited in note 106) (“[E]xcessive bail ought not to be required . . . .”).
108 US Const Amend VIII.
109 Wiseman, 36 Fordham Urban L J at 128 (cited in note 105) (tracing the history of
the Excessive Bail Clause). See also id at 130 (“[The clause’s] complex and obscure history . . . has made consensus over the precise function of the constitutional prohibition
against excessive bail elusive.”).
110 Id at 123 (“There has been relatively little innovation in the law and scholarship
on bail . . . since Salerno.”). See also United States v Salerno, 481 US 739, 752–54 (1987)
(first citing Stack v Boyle, 342 US 1, 5 (1951), and then citing Carlson v Landon, 342 US
524, 545–46 (1952), as the only two previous Supreme Court cases addressing the
Excessive Bail Clause).
111 342 US 1 (1951).
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an amount reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose is
“excessive” under the Eighth Amendment.112
Over thirty years later, in its 1987 decision in United States
v Salerno,113 the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of
the federal Bail Reform Act of 1984114 against a facial challenge
to its novel preventive (danger-based) detention provisions.115
Although the Salerno decision focused principally on these provisions, its interpretation of “excessive” under the Eighth
Amendment is broadly applicable to nonappearance risk as well.
The Salerno Court addressed the spare text of the Bail Clause
and explained that the Clause’s “only arguable substantive limitation . . . is that the Government’s proposed conditions of release or detention not be ‘excessive’ in light of the perceived
evil.”116 The Court elaborated on how excessiveness ought to be
calculated:
Of course, to determine whether the Government’s response
is excessive, we must compare that response against the interest the Government seeks to protect by means of that response. Thus, when the Government has admitted that its
only interest is in preventing flight, bail must be set by a
court at a sum designed to ensure that goal, and no more.117
The Court’s prior discussion in Stack indicated that this calculation had to be an individualized one: “Since the function of
bail is limited, the fixing of bail for any individual defendant
must be based upon standards relevant to the purpose of assuring the presence of that defendant.”118 Read together, these decisions support the claim that pretrial restrictions on liberty that

112

Id at 5.
481 US 739 (1987).
114 Pub L No 98-473, 98 Stat 1976, codified in various sections of Title 18.
115 See Salerno, 481 US at 746–49 (explaining that the challenged preventive detention provisions were “regulatory” in nature and deeming them reasonable because they
furthered the government’s legitimate interest in the safety of the community).
116 Id at 754.
117 Id.
118 Stack, 342 US at 5. The Court granted petitioners’ motion to reduce bail after the
trial court set bail based solely on the nature of the charge and without considering each
defendant’s individual circumstances. Id. Modern bail litigation decisions ground this
right to an “individualized hearing” in the Due Process Clause. See, for example, Jones v
City of Clanton, 2015 WL 5387219, *2 (MD Ala).
113
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are not tailored to the specific risk an arrestee presents are unconstitutionally “excessive.”119
This Article asserts that the inquiry into “excessiveness” requires more finely drawn distinctions between flight risk and
other forms of nonappearance risk. The government must also
be precise in proposing restrictions (detention or conditions of
release) to manage those risks.120 Although lower courts quote
these passages from Stack and Salerno,121 their embrace of the
broad concept of excessiveness has not translated into meaningful limits on pretrial detention or money bail.122 This may be
due, in part, to the “amorphous” nature of Salerno’s conception

119 Salerno, 481 US at 754. See also Wiseman, 123 Yale L J at 1393 (cited in
note 29):

At least an intermediate level of scrutiny is consistent with precedent and warranted by the text and purpose of the Eighth Amendment. Applying this
standard, the question is whether the use of money bail to ensure the defendant’s presence at trial is excessive under Salerno—that is, substantially broader than necessary to achieve the governmental interests at stake.
See also Richard S. Frase, Excessive Prison Sentences, Punishment Goals, and the Eighth
Amendment: “Proportionality” Relative to What?, 89 Minn L Rev 571, 603 (2005) (explaining that the Stack language “implies a form of means proportionality—if a lower
bail amount would suffice, any higher bail is excessive”).
120 The focus in Salerno was on whether detention was “excessive” in light of the
public-safety concerns articulated in that case. The focus in this Article is on different
forms of nonappearance risk, but similar specificity is constitutionally required for predicting different types of public-safety risk. See Salerno, 481 US at 751 (“When the
Government proves by clear and convincing evidence that an arrestee presents an identified and articulable threat to an individual or the community, we believe that, consistent
with the Due Process Clause, a court may disable the arrestee from executing that
threat.”).
121 See, for example, Campbell v Johnson, 586 F3d 835, 842 (11th Cir 2009) (“To determine whether bail is excessive, we must compare the terms of the bail against the interest the government seeks to protect.”); Galen v County of Los Angeles, 477 F3d 652,
662 (9th Cir 2007) (“Excessiveness cannot be determined by a general mathematical
formula, but rather turns on the correlation between the state interests a judicial officer
seeks to protect and the nature and magnitude of the bail conditions imposed in a particular case.”); United States v Scott, 450 F3d 863, 866 n 5 (9th Cir 2006) (“In some instances—when flight would be irrational, such as when the crime involves a minor traffic infraction—any amount of bail may be excessive because the bail amount would not
serve the purpose of ensuring appearance in court to answer the charges.”).
122 See Criminal Justice Policy Program, Moving beyond Money: A Primer on Bail
Reform *8 (Harvard Law School, Oct 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/T7S8-QV38 (arguing that Stack’s “functional analysis of bail suggests that the Eighth Amendment imposes a sliding scale, linking constitutionally permissible bond amounts (or other conditions of release) to the amount needed to incentivize particular defendants to appear at
court proceedings,” but noting that “[i]n practice, [ ] the courts have not applied this
Eighth Amendment principle in a way that has meaningfully constrained the use of
bail”) (citation omitted).
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of excessiveness.123 The advent of tools that promise a shift away
from intuitive risk estimates and toward purportedly more precise risk calculations may offer opportunities to argue for more
finely drawn measures of excessiveness in ways that were previously unsuccessful.
B.

Statutory Requirements

Federal and state statutes also constrain pretrial
decisionmaking. This Section details relevant federal statutory
law and summarizes state approaches, focusing on statutory definitions of nonappearance risks and statutory limits on judicially imposed conditions of release.
The Bail Reform Act of 1984 begins by directing a judge to
release a defendant prior to trial unless the judge “determines
that such release will not reasonably assure the appearance of
the person as required or will endanger the safety of any other
person or the community.”124 Language similar to the italicized
text appears throughout the statute, which repeatedly tasks
judges with evaluating and managing pretrial nonappearance
risks.125 Many state statutes contain similar language.126
The Bail Reform Act’s detention provisions seem to draw an
important distinction between nonappearance risk broadly and
risk of flight more specifically, although it is unclear precisely
what the drafters envisioned. Under the statute, if the court determines that there is a “serious risk that [the defendant] will
flee,”127 the court may be able to detain the defendant until trial.128 Before ordering detention, the court is required to hold a
detention hearing to determine whether any conditions of release can reasonably manage the risks presented.129 The Act
123

Mayson, 127 Yale L J at 506 (cited in note 14).
18 USC § 3142(b) (emphasis added).
125 See, for example, 18 USC § 3142(c) (requiring a judge to order the pretrial release of a defendant on personal recognizance or unsecured appearance bond if “[the
judge] determines that the release . . . will not reasonably assure the appearance of the
[defendant] as required . . .”) (emphasis added).
126 See, for example, DC Code § 23-1322(b)(1) (“The judicial officer shall hold a hearing to determine whether any condition or combination of conditions . . . will reasonably
assure the appearance of the person . . . .”).
127 18 USC § 3142(f)(2)(A).
128 18 USC § 3142(d)(2), (e)(1) (contemplating both shorter- and longer-term pretrial
detention).
129 18 USC § 3142(e)(1). For a detention hearing to be held, either the government
or the judicial officer must move to hold the hearing. 18 USC § 3142(f)(2). The motion
must be made by the government if the case involves a narrow list of violent crimes or
124
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does not appear to permit a detention hearing based solely on
general nonappearance risk,130 and the rule is clear: a detention
hearing must be held in order to detain a defendant until trial.131
The statute draws the distinction between flight and nonappearance only with respect to detention; it does not otherwise
distinguish or define the terms.132
The Act limits judicial authority by generally requiring reasonable assessments of risks and by permitting only the “least
restrictive” conditions of release that are necessary to assure
that defendants will appear.133 Specifically, the Act authorizes
judges to impose conditions on released defendants that those
judges view as necessary to “reasonably assure the appearance”
of defendants at future court proceedings,134 but limits judicial
discretion in that judges are required to choose “the least restrictive further condition, or combination of conditions, that
such judicial officer determines will reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required and the safety of any other
person and the community.”135 Many state statutes echo this
least-restrictive-conditions provision of the federal statute.136
C.

Judicial Interpretations of Statutory Risk Factors

Judges have traditionally relied on a series of statutorily
prescribed factors to predict pretrial risks.137 The statutes typically do not specify whether a particular factor is relevant to

crimes with severe maximum sentences, 18 USC § 3142(f)(1), but can be made either by
the government or the judicial officer for cases that involve a “serious risk that [the defendant] will flee,” 18 USC § 3142(f)(2)(A), or “a serious risk that [the defendant] will
obstruct or attempt to obstruct justice, or threaten . . . or attempt to threaten . . . a prospective witness or juror,” 18 USC § 3142(f)(2)(B).
130 See, for example, 18 USC § 3142(d)(2), (e)(1). The statute’s lack of clarity about
the definitions of flight and nonappearance and the inconsistent use of these terms in
other contexts make it difficult to state this with more certainty.
131 18 USC § 3142(e)(1).
132 18 USC § 3142(g)(3)(A).
133 18 USC § 3142(c)(1)(B).
134 18 USC § 3142(c)(1)(B).
135 18 USC § 3142(c)(1)(B).
136 See Wiseman, 123 Yale L J at 1395 n 229 (cited in note 29) (collecting state statutes “that require the use of the least restrictive means”).
137 See, for example, 18 USC § 3142(g); NY Crim Proc Law § 510.30(2)(a); Ohio Rev
Code Ann § 2937.222(C); Tenn Code Ann § 40-11-115(b); Fla Stat Ann § 903.046(2). See
also Baradaran and McIntyre, 90 Tex L Rev at 503–04 (cited in note 24) (describing the
historical development of statutory risk factors).
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flight risk or to public-safety risk.138 Nor do they meaningfully or
consistently distinguish between risks of nonappearance or
flight as proposed in Part IV. Judges applying these statutory
factors describe their task in both ways: as ensuring a defendant’s appearance and as preventing a defendant’s flight.139 Indeed, judges talk in terms of “flight risk” even in states where
the statutes discuss only nonappearance.140 Because these statutory factors provide limited guidance and restraint, they give
significant discretion to judges, who are imperfect agents.141 As
jurisdictions contemplate legislative reforms and adopt riskassessment tools, they must clarify the continuing role of these
factors in guiding judicial decisionmaking. More specific and
careful consideration of the factors’ predictive utility is overdue.
The following sections briefly review the traditional factors
that have been relied on by judges as predictive of
nonappearance or flight, organizing them into four broad categories: (i) factors that suggest incentives to flee the jurisdiction or
to avoid court deliberately; (ii) those that suggest an ability to
flee the jurisdiction; (iii) those that show a defendant’s connections or anchors to the jurisdiction (and thus discount flight
risk); and (iv) those factors that, without suggesting flight from

138 See Part I.A. See also Gouldin, 2016 BYU L Rev at 865–66 (cited in note 16)
(surveying state and federal laws that prescribe factors to be considered in pretrial decisionmaking and concluding that “the statutes do not indicate which factors are relevant
to flight risk and which are believed to predict dangerousness”).
139 See, for example, United States v Bustamante-Conchas, 557 Fed Appx 803, 806
(10th Cir 2014) (describing conditions that will “protect against [defendant’s] risk of
flight” and “reasonably assure [his] appearance”); Ex parte Castillo-Lorente, 420 SW3d
884, 888–90 (Tex App 2014) (evaluating whether high bail set by trial court would “secure the defendant’s presence at trial” and “deter [him] from fleeing the jurisdiction”);
Hernandez v State, 669 SE2d 434, 435 (Ga App 2008) (“The trial court’s foremost consideration when fixing the amount of bail should be the probability that the defendant, if
freed, will appear at trial.”).
140 See, for example, Fry v State, 990 NE2d 429, 446 (Ind 2013) (ruling that a court
can release a defendant on “his own personal recognizance, unless the state shows evidence of a flight risk”), citing Ind Code § 35-33-8-3.2(a) (“[A] court may admit a defendant to bail and impose any of the following conditions to assure the defendant’s appearance at any stage of the legal proceedings, or . . . to assure the public’s physical safety.”)
(emphasis added).
141 Wiseman, 84 Geo Wash L Rev at 438 (cited in note 15) (“Judges make pretrial
release decisions with only weak legislative guidance, and this grant of discretion gives
rise to agency costs.”) (citation omitted). In light of these concerns, Wiseman proposes
taking discretion away from judges entirely. See id (insisting that “[t]he next wave of
bail reform should aim not at guiding judges’ discretion, but at radically limiting it—a
classic means of reducing certain agency costs”).
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the jurisdiction, nevertheless raise concerns about the defendant’s reliability or trustworthiness (to return to court).
1. Incentives to flee the jurisdiction or avoid court.
Courts frequently cite the first two statutory factors listed
in the federal bail statute—the seriousness of the offense and
the weight of the evidence—as giving defendants incentives to
flee the jurisdiction or otherwise to avoid court.142 In the taxonomy that follows in Part IV, these factors might be expected to
predict flight or local absconding. This analysis assumes that defendants’ actual behavior matches their incentives; that is, that
defendants with greater incentives actually flee or fail to appear
at higher rates. As outlined below, several studies question the
validity of those assumptions.
a) Offense seriousness. The seriousness of the offense of
arrest is the factor that prosecutors and judges most frequently
cite when claiming that a defendant poses a serious flight risk.
The argument is straightforward: because more serious charges
carry heavier penalties, defendants have increased incentives to
flee. Both federal143 and state144 courts frequently repeat this
claim. Federal and state statutory presumptions in favor of detention for certain types of offenses also rely on this argument.145
Indeed, the seriousness of the alleged offense is the sole factor
that determines money bail in jurisdictions with preset bail
schedules.146
142

18 USC § 3142(g)(1)–(2).
See, for example, United States v English, 629 F3d 311, 320 (2d Cir 2011) (upholding a detention order by a district-court judge who would have granted a bail motion
had the defendant not been charged with both firearm and drug offenses); United States
v Timley, 236 Fed Appx 441, 442 (10th Cir 2007) (endorsing the district court’s detention
order for a defendant facing a mandatory life sentence because of the high incentive to
flee); United States v Craven, 1998 WL 196622, *2 (1st Cir) (finding that the potential
penalties give the defendant “a greater incentive to flee”).
144 See, for example, Sneed v State, 946 NE2d 1255, 1259 (Ind App 2011) (noting
that the “severity of the charges against [the defendant] sufficiently counterbalances her
ties in the community and history of appearing in court”). See also Garcia v Wasylyshyn,
2007 WL 2216971, *2 (Ohio App) (“The nature and number of counts, as well as the possible sentences if convicted, support the implication that petitioner may indeed be a
flight risk.”).
145 See 18 USC § 3142(e)(2)–(3), (f)(1). Many states have similar rebuttable presumptions against release. See, for example, Alaska Stat § 12.30.011(d)(2); NC Gen Stat
§ 15A-533(d), (e).
146 See Statement of Interest of the United States, Varden v City of Clanton, Civil
Action No 15-34, *9 (MD Ala filed Feb 13, 2015) (“Varden Statement of Interest”)
(“Fixed-sum bail systems . . . [set money bail] based solely on the criminal charge.”);
143
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Assuming that offense seriousness correlates to flight risk
has intuitive appeal, but decades of bail studies challenge that
claim.147 As noted earlier, defendants charged with more serious
offenses like murder or rape do not, in fact, fail to appear at
higher rates than those with lesser charges.148
These studies conclude that other factors, such as employment, family ties, community reputation, and prior record of appearances, are better predictors of nonappearance.149 Although
reformers have been successful in getting judges to pay attention to other factors over time,150 most judges still rely heavily on
the charge.151
In some cases, judges have also described a second link between FTA and the seriousness of the charged offense. Some
judges, in addition to viewing offense seriousness as predictive
of flight, believe that the seriousness of the offense represents
the costs of an FTA.152 In other words, for more serious crimes,

Subramanian, et al, Incarceration’s Front Door at *32 (cited in note 4) (“[Bail schedules]
link bail amounts to the severity of the initial charge, with criminal charge serving as a
proxy for risk of re-arrest and flight, and the bail amount meant to mitigate that risk.”)
(citation omitted).
147 See, for example, Jennifer Fratello, Annie Salsich, and Sara Mogulescu, Juvenile
Detention Reform in New York City: Measuring Risk through Research *9 (Vera Institute
of Justice, Apr 2011), archived at http://perma.cc/SV2T-CKKP (“Neither charge type nor
charge severity . . . were found to be associated with failure to appear or rearrest [of juvenile defendants], even though these factors are often included in normatively based
detention risk assessments.”); Kelly Dedel and Garth Davies, Validating Multnomah
County’s Juvenile Detention Risk Assessment Instrument *8 (Multnomah County
Department of Community Justice, June 11, 2007), archived at http://perma.cc/8JXRG2R4 (analyzing a risk-assessment instrument and identifying that offense seriousness
was negatively correlated with pretrial FTA or rearrest); John S. Goldkamp and Michael
R. Gottfredson, Policy Guidelines for Bail: An Experiment in Court Reform 70 (Temple
1985) (“When failure rates are examined by the seriousness of the defendant’s charges,
the relation assumed by the conventional wisdom is not found: failure rates do not increase directly with seriousness levels.”).
148 See notes 58–59 and accompanying text.
149 See note 147.
150 See, for example, United States v Friedman, 837 F2d 48, 49 (2d Cir 1988) (“[T]he
Bail Reform Act does not permit detention on the basis of dangerousness in the absence
of risk of flight, obstruction of justice or an indictment for the [enumerated] offenses.”);
id at 50 (requiring “more than evidence of the commission of a serious crime and the fact
of a potentially long sentence to support a finding of risk of flight”).
151 See Goldkamp and Vîlcică, Judicial Discretion and the Unfinished Agenda of
American Bail Reform at 125 (cited in note 15) (discussing evidence that “pretrial
detention could even be assigned as outright punishment based on the charge
standard”).
152 Id at 131–32 (explaining that some judges have been reluctant to give up on the
“charge standard”—that is, setting bail according to “the seriousness of the lead charge
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some judges are likely to impose higher bail or detain defendants at higher rates because they perceive an increased “justice”
cost to the community if a defendant who has committed a serious crime flees the jurisdiction, avoiding possible conviction and
punishment.153 While this argument is compelling, it does not alter the predictive value of offense seriousness. Instead, it
suggests that for more serious offenses, judges will be more risk
averse.
b) Weight of the evidence. As the argument goes, the
stronger the prosecutor’s case against the defendant (that is, the
weight of the evidence), the more likely it is that the defendant
will be convicted, either because she will plead guilty in the face
of a strong case or a jury will be more likely to find her guilty.
The greater the chance of conviction, the greater the incentive to
flee. Here, again, this increased incentive to flee is viewed as increasing flight risk. As with offense seriousness, the perceived
increased likelihood of guilt may also influence judges who will
see the loss of the opportunity for justice as a factor if a guilty
defendant flees.154
Like the seriousness of the offense, the strength of the prosecution’s case has a long historical pedigree155 and is embedded
in many federal and state statutes.156 Judges denying bail also
frequently discuss the weight of the evidence. Although this factor could be relevant to any risk of nonappearance, judges who
discuss this factor in setting high bail amounts (or who deny bail
on this ground) frequently describe their concerns in terms of
“flight.”157

in a defendant’s case”—because they view the seriousness of the charge as “a crude indication of the potential costs” of losing defendants to flight).
153 Id. Judges taking this view clearly presume the guilt of the arrestee.
154 See note 151.
155 See Kalhous and Meringolo, 32 Pace L Rev at 804 (cited in note 102) (tracing
consideration of “the strength of the evidence” and “the likelihood of conviction” to at
least the Statute of Westminster in 1275), citing Carbone, 34 Syracuse L Rev at 526–27
(cited in note 102). These practices continued in colonial America. Throughout the colonial period, both the seriousness of the charge and the weight of the evidence were
viewed as “effective proxies for the risk of flight—where conviction appeared more likely,
the presumption that the accused would flee was stronger.” Id at 806–07.
156 See, for example, 18 USC § 3142(g)(2); Ohio Rev Code Ann § 2937.222(C)(2).
157 Compare, for example, Bustamante-Conchas, 557 Fed Appx at 804 (affirming the
decision to release the defendant when there was “substantial circumstantial evidence,
but no direct evidence” that the defendant was guilty), with, for example, United States v
Berkun, 392 Fed Appx 901, 903 (2d Cir 2010) (“Because the evidence of guilt is strong, it
provides [the defendant] with an incentive to flee.”).

2018]

Defining Flight Risk

707

Scholars have long recognized the due process concerns that
are implicated by setting conditions of release or denying release
based on a pretrial assessment of the prosecution’s case.158
Professor Shima Baradaran Baughman explains that the effects
of pretrial detention, both on the likelihood of conviction and the
severity of the sentence that will be imposed, can erode the presumption of innocence.159
2. Ability to flee the jurisdiction.
Many statutes include factors that seek to predict which defendants are true flight risks. Ideally, judges would focus on
those defendants who are likely to flee and not simply those who
are able to flee.160 Because it is more difficult to ascertain or predict a defendant’s inclinations, however, judges making flight
risk predictions often focus on a defendant’s ability to flee.161 The
distinction is subtle. A defendant’s intent to flee might be inferred from prior flight or a lack of cooperation with authorities,
which are discussed below as reliability or trustworthiness factors.162 Judges may also look for evidence of preparation to leave
the jurisdiction.163 Predicting a defendant’s ability to flee, however, generally involves analyzing her ties to other jurisdictions
and her resources, both of which are discussed briefly below.

158 See Baradaran, 72 Ohio St L J at 771 (cited in note 24) (noting that a bail hearing can become “a mini-trial before the actual trial (and significantly, without many of
the protections that accompany a defendant at trial)”).
159 Id at 770–72. See also Stack, 342 US at 4:

This traditional right to freedom before conviction permits the unhampered
preparation of a defense, and serves to prevent the infliction of punishment
prior to conviction. . . . Unless this right to bail before trial is preserved, the
presumption of innocence, secured only after centuries of struggle, would lose
its meaning.
160 See, for example, Bacon v United States, 449 F2d 933, 944 (9th Cir 1971) (finding
that, although the government alleged that the defendant was able to flee, the government failed to establish a likelihood of flight).
161 See, for example, United States v El-Hage, 213 F3d 74, 80 (2d Cir 2000) (making
a flight determination because of the defendant’s “apparent access to false documents,
his extensive history of travel and residence in other countries, and his alleged ties to an
extensive and well-organized terrorist group whose leader and seven other of whose indicted members are still at large”).
162 See, for example, Bacon, 449 F2d at 944 (finding no flight risk when “[t]here
was no showing of past attempts . . . to evade judicial process, nor of past clandestine
travels”).
163 See, for example, El-Hage, 213 F3d at 80 (highlighting the defendant’s “apparent
access to false documents” as a reason for determining that he was a flight risk).
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In a 1978 decision granting bail pending appeal to Truong
Dinh Hung (who was already convicted of espionage), Justice
William Brennan emphasized this difference between ability to
flee and intention to flee.164 The district court revoked Truong’s
bail after his conviction based on his Vietnamese citizenship and
family ties, his contacts with the Vietnamese ambassador in
Paris (with whom he had exchanged classified information), and
his lack of permanent residence in the United States.165 The
Fourth Circuit affirmed.166 Writing as the circuit justice for the
Fourth Circuit, Brennan reversed, citing Truong’s domestic ties
and numerous character references. He explained that even if
the considerations cited by the lower courts “suggest opportunities for flight, they hardly establish any inclination on the part
of applicant to flee.”167 As we work to develop and refine our
flight risk predictions, we should evaluate how well a defendant’s ability to flee meaningfully predicts his intention to flee.
a) Ties outside the jurisdiction. Defendants with significant ties outside the jurisdiction are traditionally viewed as
more likely, or at least more able, to flee.168 Courts evaluating
ties to another jurisdiction consider: (i) both family and financial

164

See Truong Dinh Hung v United States, 439 US 1326, 1328–29 (1978) (“Truong II”).
See id at 1326–27.
166 United States v Truong Dinh Hung, 577 F2d 738 (4th Cir 1978) (table) (“Truong I”).
167 Truong II, 439 US at 1329. Truong appeared as required and his case became
known for establishing the “primary purpose” standard that was eventually incorporated
into the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. See United States v Truong Dinh Hung,
629 F2d 908, 915 (4th Cir 1980) (“Truong III”) (holding that warrantless surveillance
that was “conducted primarily for foreign intelligence reasons” did not violate the Fourth
Amendment) (quotation marks omitted).
168 These issues arise most often for defendants with significant overseas ties. See
Kalhous and Meringolo, 32 Pace L Rev at 829 (cited in note 101) (“Another very common
reason [for a defendant to be denied bail] is the country of origin of a defendant—
whether he is a citizen or not. A naturalized citizen with contacts abroad is viewed with
skepticism.”). Relatedly, as outlined in the next Section, defendants with domestic connections and anchors are viewed as a lower risk of flight.
165
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connections;169 (ii) a defendant’s travel history;170 and (iii) the jurisdiction’s extradition practices.171
This factor, of course, is entirely flight focused. Foreign ties
may be predictive of whether a defendant remains in the jurisdiction or flees, but for defendants who remain in the jurisdiction, foreign ties are irrelevant to the likelihood that the defendants will appear for court, except to the extent that they may
correlate with language or cultural barriers to information about
court processes or schedules.
b) Resources. Courts frequently analyze a defendant’s resources in evaluating flight risk.172 In short, courts view wealthier defendants as more able to flee the jurisdiction and to sustain
their flight.
In a number of controversial, high-profile cases, courts have
ordered wealthy defendants to be confined in their homes prior
to trial (as opposed to ordering them to be detained in jail facilities) on the condition that these defendants (or their families)
pay for twenty-four-hour private security.173 In a 2016 news article describing these self-funded “gilded cage” arrangements,
Judge Jed Rakoff (who nevertheless ordered a defendant’s release on these conditions) was described as having “acknowledged concerns that such an arrangement . . . gave people of

169 See, for example, United States v Villapudua-Quintero, 308 Fed Appx 272, 273
(10th Cir 2009) (affirming magistrate judge’s conclusion that family ties to Mexico rendered the defendant a flight risk); United States v Kattar, 1992 WL 80317, *4–5 (1st Cir)
(considering factors like the defendant’s Lebanese passport, real property, and bank accounts when deciding whether to grant petition for release).
170 See, for example, Bustamante-Conchas, 557 Fed Appx at 805 (considering defendant’s frequent and recent visits to Mexico); United States v Bonilla, 388 Fed Appx
78, 80 (2d Cir 2010) (considering defendant’s frequent trips to the Dominican Republic in
recent years); United States v Khanu, 370 Fed Appx 121, 121–22 (DC Cir 2010) (considering defendant’s citizenship and pre-indictment trip to Sierra Leone).
171 See, for example, Kalhous and Meringolo, 32 Pace L Rev at 829–33 (cited in note
102) (“[T]he government has advanced the proposition that individual defendants with
ties to Israel present an additional risk of flight given Israel’s Law of Return.”).
172 See, for example, United States v Valdivia, 104 Fed Appx 753, 754–55 (1st Cir
2004) (relying on the defendant’s “resources and foreign contacts” and “established ties
outside the United States” to conclude that he posed a flight risk); United States v
Aitken, 898 F2d 104, 107 (9th Cir 1990) (concluding that defendant was a flight risk in
part because he had “access to large sums of cash”). See also Craven, 1998 WL 196622 at
*2 (discussing legislative history pertaining to flight risk and drug trafficking).
173 See, for example, United States v Madoff, 586 F Supp 2d 240, 243–44 (SDNY
2009); United States v Sabhnani, 493 F3d 63, 80 (2d Cir 2007) (“The defendants shall
pay all costs associated with electronic monitoring.”).
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means ‘an opportunity for release that poorer people could never
obtain.’” 174
The vast majority of defendants, whose resources fall far
short of those of the defendants just described, are on the other
end of the spectrum. While these defendants may pose risks of
nonappearance,175 their socioeconomic status makes it unlikely that they could flee from the jurisdiction. Successful flight
from the jurisdiction suggests access to networks and resources that are not part of the equation for the vast majority
of nonappearing defendants.
A federal district-court judge in Detroit recently summarized
this distinction succinctly. In rejecting the Government’s assertion that the defendant was a flight risk, the judge explained:
The Court disagrees. Defendant has lived in the community
his entire life, was employed for over a year and living with
his girlfriend and their infant daughter until his arrest. . . .
Contrary to the government’s view, defendant is not a risk
of flight. Offenders like defendant almost never flee; they
have nowhere to go.176
3. Anchors to the jurisdiction.
Federal and state statutes also include a series of factors
that function as anchors to the jurisdiction, reducing the risk
that a defendant will flee the jurisdiction. These include a defendant’s family responsibilities, community ties, employment or
educational commitments, citizenship, and length of residency.177 While these factors have traditionally been discussed by

174 Benjamin Weiser, Rich Defendants’ Request to Judges: Lock Me Up in a Gilded
Cage
(NY
Times,
June
1,
2016),
online
at
http://www.nytimes.com
/2016/06/02/nyregion/rich-defendants-request-to-judges-lock-me-up-in-a-gilded-cage.html
(visited Nov 9, 2017) (Perma archive unavailable), quoting United States v Dreier, 596 F
Supp 2d 831, 833 (SDNY 2009).
175 See Part IV.B.1.
176 Amended Memorandum: Reasons for Pretrial Release, United States v Smith,
Criminal Action No 15-20053, *2 (ED Mich filed May 4, 2015) (available on Westlaw at
2015 WL 2084720).
177 See, for example, 18 USC § 3142(g)(3) (listing among factors to be considered in
determining conditions of release: “the history and characteristics of the person, including . . . family ties, employment, financial resources, length of residence in the community, community ties . . .”); Ohio Rev Code Ann § 2937.222(C)(3)(a) (“[Factors include] family ties, employment, . . . length of residence in the community, community ties [and
others].”).
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both federal and state courts in terms of flight,178 they are also
relevant to predicting and managing the categories of local nonappearances that are included in the taxonomy.
Connections to the jurisdiction operate in two ways. First,
courts view them as anchors to the jurisdiction, creating incentives for released defendants to stay. Second, they make defendants remaining in the jurisdiction easier to locate, either before
(for reminders) or after a scheduled appearance.179
4. Reliability and trustworthiness.
The final set of statutory factors reflects a court’s assessment of the defendant’s reliability or trustworthiness to show up
for court. These factors are relevant to all of the categories of
nonappearance proposed in Part IV.
a) Prior record (defaults, nonappearances, or cooperation).
Most federal and state statutes direct courts to consider evidence of a defendant’s past “record concerning appearance at
court proceedings” when weighing pretrial risks.180 Nearly seventy years ago in Stack, Justice Robert Jackson described this
information as relevant to a defendant’s “trustworthiness to appear for trial.”181 As Jackson explained, this evaluation should
include positive and negative evidence: “Each accused is entitled
to any benefits due to his good record, and misdeeds or a bad
record should prejudice only those who are guilty of them.”182 In
appropriate cases, courts have also considered a related measure: a defendant’s prior cooperation with authorities.183
178 Compare, for example, Valdivia, 104 Fed Appx at 754 (finding that the defendant’s strong family and community ties did not overcome the presumption in favor of detention), and Hernandez, 669 SE2d at 435 (upholding high bail amount in light of the
fact that the defendant did not own a home in the state, among other factors), with, for
example, United States v Xulam, 84 F3d 441, 442 (DC Cir 1996) (overturning denial of
bail for a defendant who had strong community ties and posed no threat to the community), and State v Brown, 338 P3d 1276, 1291–92 (NM 2014) (overturning high bail amount
when the defendant had employment as well as family and community ties).
179 See Part IV.B.1 (discussing low-cost nonappearances).
180 18 USC § 3142(g)(3)(A). See also, for example, DC Code § 23-1322(e)(3)(A) (using
the same language as the federal statute).
181 Stack, 342 US at 9 (Jackson concurring). Some statutes include factors that permit a more general inquiry into trustworthiness. See, for example, NY Crim Proc Law
§ 510.30(2)(a)(i) (“The principal’s character, reputation, habits, and mental condition . . .
[are factors in] the issuance of . . . bail.”).
182 Stack, 342 US at 9 (Jackson concurring).
183 See, for example, United States v Clum, 492 Fed Appx 81, 85 (11th Cir 2012)
(noting the defendant’s prior refusal to cooperate). See also Lauryn P. Gouldin, When
Deference Is Dangerous: The Judicial Role in Material-Witness Detentions, 49 Am Crim L
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Federal and state courts applying this factor describe it as
predictive of “flight”184 and “nonappearance risk.”185 Particularly
when defendants have multiple FTAs, courts and riskassessment tools give this factor substantial weight.186
b) Substance abuse. In some cases, judges have also
used a defendant’s drug or alcohol abuse, another statutory
factor, as evidence that the defendant is a greater risk of nonappearance.187 Occasionally, courts note the lack of such problems as reducing the risk of nonappearance.188
***
Analyzed collectively, the statutory factors that guide judges’ discretion pose several problems. First, as noted above, further work must be done to confirm the factors’ predictive utility.
Second, the statutes themselves provide little direction to judges
about which factors are relevant to which pretrial risks and how
to weigh the presence of multiple factors. As a result, judges
have broad discretion, which they use to overmanage pretrial

Rev 1333, 1349–50 (2012) (analyzing relevance of prior cooperation to flight-risk analysis
in material-witness cases).
184 See, for example, Berkun, 392 Fed Appx at 903 (upholding detention because the
defendant committed the alleged crime while on bail for a different crime, revealing a
“record of deceiving the court”); United States v Kisling, 334 F3d 734, 735 (8th Cir 2003)
(upholding the denial of bail when defendant’s history of avoiding his legal troubles, including evading service and an FTA, made him a flight risk). See also, for example,
Querubin v Commonwealth, 795 NE2d 534, 544 (Mass 2003) (holding that defendant was
a flight risk because he was known to use an alias, originally eluded several police officers when they attempted to arrest him on several default warrants, and as a result
failed to appear before the court on a cocaine trafficking charge); People v Gurule, 174
P3d 846, 846 (Colo App 2007) (upholding the denial of an appeal bond because the court
determined that the defendant posed a flight risk due to his FTA for a sentencing proceeding and return only several months later).
185 See, for example, Clum, 492 Fed Appx at 85 (upholding the district court’s denial
of bail when the defendant resisted arrest, refused to cooperate, and had a history of defying the authority of the courts, including one FTA).
186 See notes 214–28 and accompanying text (discussing the Arnold Foundation’s
risk-assessment tool). See also, for example, United States v Rico, 551 Fed Appx 446, 447
(10th Cir 2014) (finding the defendant’s two recent FTAs relevant to nonappearance risk
analysis); State v Dunn, 2014 WL 3714647, *5 (Vt) (upholding the defendant’s substantial monetary bail due to two previous FTAs, two probation violations, and an out-ofstate address).
187 18 USC § 3142(g)(3)(A). See also, for example, Fla Rules Crim Proc § 3.131(b)(3);
Rico, 551 Fed Appx at 447 (finding the defendant to be a flight risk due in part to his
history of drug and alcohol abuse).
188 See, for example, Bustamante-Conchas, 557 Fed Appx at 804 (favoring release
when, among other factors, the defendant lacked a history of drug or alcohol abuse);
Brown, 338 P3d at 1291 (same).
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risks.189 For these reasons, jurisdictions across the country have
been anxious to modernize and refine the process of pretrial risk
prediction. The products of those efforts are the focus of Part III.
III. PREDICTING NONAPPEARANCE: MODERN RISK-ASSESSMENT
TOOLS
Risk-assessment tools that employ “rigorous, scientific,
data-driven” analyses promise a move away from unbridled judicial discretion and from problematic judicial reliance on “gut
and intuition.”190 But these tools have serious issues relating to
the calculation of nonappearance risk.191
First, as I have argued previously, many tools merge nonappearance and public-safety risks into one “pretrial failure”
risk measurement despite constitutional, statutory, and policy
arguments for measuring those risks separately.192 Second, as
detailed here and in Part IV.B, the tools predict nonappearance
risk in only its broadest form. Thus, these tools ignore both longstanding doctrinal and statutory emphasis on concerns about
flight risk and clear, practical policy needs for a more nuanced
understanding of the problems of nonappearance. Finally, these
risk-assessment tools measure only this very broadly defined
nonappearance risk in the absence of any court intervention.
Judges, however, need guidance and feedback about how to
manage flight risk using existing tools.193 Most statutes can be
interpreted as requiring this sort of inquiry. A static
189 See Wiseman, 84 Geo Wash L Rev at 426–28 (cited in note 15) (discussing how
judicial discretion creates agency costs).
190 Developing a National Model for Pretrial Risk Assessment at *5 (cited in note 17).
To be clear, risk assessment is not new. The statutory risk factors outlined in Part II.C
were designed to help judges assess risk. Those factors derived from risk-assessment
tools developed by the Vera Institute of Justice in the 1960s. Risk-assessment tools,
however, have evolved considerably over time. For a detailed summary of the history of
these tools and of their use in a range of criminal justice contexts, see Melissa Hamilton,
Risk-Needs Assessment: Constitutional and Ethical Challenges, 52 Am Crim L Rev 231,
236–39 (2015); id at 233 (explaining that these tools are seeing their “heyday in criminal
justice”). See also Melissa Hamilton, Back to the Future: The Influence of Criminal
History on Risk Assessments, 20 Berkeley J Crim L 75, 91–95 (providing a general summary of how these tools work).
191 As noted in Part III.C, these tools have prompted a range of other thoughtful and
well-developed critiques, many of which are beyond the scope of this Article.
192 Gouldin, 2016 BYU L Rev at 892 (cited in note 16).
193 See Subramanian, et al, Incarceration’s Front Door at *31 (cited in note 4) (“[T]he
best [risk-assessment] tools evaluate the person’s dynamic or changeable risk factors and
needs, [so] they should be re-administered routinely to determine whether current supervision or custody levels and programming are still appropriate.”).
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nonappearance calculation that does not incorporate various
conditions of release, then, is of limited utility.
In the following sections, this Article (i) briefly reviews the
connection between risk assessment and broader bail reform efforts; (ii) examines how the tools define risks of nonappearance
and validate outcomes; and (iii) evaluates why the tools have
been inattentive to distinctions between flight and other forms
of nonappearance.
A.

Bail Reform, Generally

In a 2013 report describing the impetus for its efforts to develop a national pretrial risk-assessment tool, the Laura and
John Arnold Foundation explained that, in jurisdictions that do
not rely on risk assessment, “too many high-risk defendants go
free, and too many low-risk defendants remain locked up for
long periods.”194 In June 2016, the Obama administration announced the Data-Driven Justice Initiative—with increased use
of these tools as one of its key strategies—reflecting a growing
consensus that risk-assessment tools should more effectively
identify low-risk defendants who should be released before trial.195 As the tools become more economical, more jurisdictions
are adopting them.196
The rise of risk assessment has occurred alongside another
pretrial reform agenda: the effort to end reliance on money bail
as a means of managing pretrial risk. For decades, and despite
legislative reforms, judges have transformed bail from a condition of release to a predicate for detention.
Reformers have focused on eliminating money bail or, alternatively, radically changing how bail amounts are set. New
Jersey and New Mexico have enacted comprehensive constitutional and legislative changes, shifting away from money bail.197

194 See Developing a National Model for Pretrial Risk Assessment at *5 (cited in note
17) (“These systemic failures put the public in danger and place unnecessary strain on
budgets, jails, law enforcement, families, and communities.”).
195 FACT SHEET: Launching the Data-Driven Justice Initiative (cited in note 1).
196 Shaila Dewan, Judges Replacing Conjecture with Formula for Bail (NY Times,
June 26, 2015), online at http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/27/us/turning-the-granting-of
-bail-into-a-science.html (visited Nov 9, 2017) (Perma archive unavailable). In 2015, fewer than 10 percent of jurisdictions were employing these types of tools, but that number
has been increasing. Id.
197 Equal Justice Initiative, Delaware Access to Justice Commission’s Committee on
Fairness in the Criminal Justice System: A Report on Bail and Pretrial Detention *9 (Oct
2015), archived at http://perma.cc/2VC7-R7EU (“In 2014, New Jersey passed two pieces
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Connecticut passed legislation in June 2017 that significantly
limits the use of money bail in misdemeanor cases,198 and, at the
time of this writing, Governor Andrew Cuomo is advocating for
comparable changes in New York.199 In February 2017, the
Maryland Court of Appeals approved changes to the Maryland
Rules of Procedure intended to reduce (but not eliminate) reliance on money bail by requiring judges to consider defendants’
ability to pay before setting bail.200 Class-action plaintiffs have,
with support from the Obama administration’s Department of
Justice, forced reforms in jurisdictions across the country by
bringing successful challenges to existing money-bail systems.201
Reformers have also sought to change who pays bail, advocating

of bail/pretrial detainment reform legislation concurrently . . . [to] shift[ ] New Jersey’s
pretrial release system from a money-based bail system to a primarily risk-based system.”). See Chapter 31, 2014 NJ Sess Law 467, codified at NJ Stat Ann § 2A:162-15 to
-26; NJ Const Art I, ¶ 11, amended by 2014 NJ Sess Law 865. See also Lisa W. Foderaro,
New Jersey Alters Its Bail System and Upends Legal Landscape (NY Times, Feb 6, 2017),
online at http://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/06/nyregion/new-jersey-bail-system.html (visited Nov 9, 2017) (Perma archive unavailable) (explaining that these changes, which
went into effect in January 2017, “placed the state in the forefront of a national movement aimed at changing [the] bail system”). New Mexico voters recently amended their
constitution. See NM Const Art II, § 13 (declaring that no defendant eligible for pretrial
release shall “be detained solely because of financial inability to post a money or property bond”); Susan Montoya Bryan, Voters: Judges Can Deny Bail to Dangerous Defendants
(Santa Fe New Mexican, Nov 8, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/6SF6-LU2Z.
198 See Press Release, Gov. Malloy Signs Legislation Reforming the State’s Pretrial
Justice System to Help Break the Cycle of Crime and Poverty (Office of Governor Dannel
P. Malloy, June 28, 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/2SWC-LY26; An Act concerning
Pretrial Justice Reform, Public Act 17-145, codified at Conn Gen Stat § 54-64a(a) et seq.
199 See Steve Hughes, Cuomo’s Bail Reform Effort Spurs Debate (Times Union, Feb
11, 2018), archived at http://perma.cc/7RZ9-UVBK (“New York appears increasingly likely to join several other states that have enacted bail reforms.”); Andrew M. Cuomo, New
York State: Excelsior Ever Upward, 2018 State of the State *59–60 (2018), archived at
http://perma.cc/HLG3-B4WG.
200 Md Rule 4-216.1(b)(2) (calling for “individualized consideration” of a defendant’s
“ability . . . to meet a special condition of release with financial terms”). Additional legislative reforms may follow. See Michael Dresser, Maryland Court of Appeals: Defendants
Can’t Be Held in Jail Because They Can’t Afford Bail (Baltimore Sun, Feb 8, 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/PBX6-A4Y3.
201 See, for example, Varden Statement of Interest at *1 (cited in note 146) (associated with a case in which Ms. Varden, an indigent defendant, was jailed after the
Clanton Municipal Court used a generic bail schedule to impose bail in the amount of
$2,000, which she could not afford to pay). The Department of Justice filed a statement
of interest in the case asserting: “Incarcerating individuals solely because of their inability to pay for their release, whether through the payment of fines, fees, or a cash bond,
violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id. This statement
of interest has since been cited in bail challenges across the country. See, for example,
Thompson v Moss Point, 2015 WL 10322003, *1 (SD Miss).
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for the end of commercial bail202 and promoting the use of community bail funds.203
The significant investment of time, resources, and political
capital in both of these efforts—increasing the use of riskassessment tools and reducing reliance on money bail—has been
cause for optimism that what is being described as a “third generation,” or “third wave,” of bail reform might achieve meaningful change.204 In most places, these reform efforts are paired,
with money bail schemes giving way to risk assessment.
B.

Defining and Describing Risks of Nonappearance

Although the tools being used in jurisdictions across the
country vary from each other in interesting ways, they have a
few important common features. In addition to gauging a particular defendant’s “danger to the community,” each tool endeavors “to identify the likelihood of failure to appear in
court.”205 No tool mentions or measures “flight risk.”206

202 Commercial bail bondsmen or commercial sureties provide bail to defendants for
a price and have, over time, become a fixture in American criminal justice. Their lobbyists frequently challenge bail reform efforts. Many groups advocate for abolition of these
for-profit bail enterprises. See Justice Policy Institute, Finding Direction: Expanding
Criminal Justice Options by Considering Policies of Other Nations *1–3 (Apr 2011), archived at http://perma.cc/YMF5-7PSU (observing that other countries like Australia,
Canada, Finland, Germany, and England do not permit commercial bail).
203 In 2015, a New York City council member recommended that the city allocate
$1.4 million of community funds to pay “bail set at $2,000 or lower for defendants
charged with low-level misdemeanors and unable to afford it.” Emily Ngo, NYC Council
Speaker Melissa Mark-Viverito Proposes Bail Fund for Indigent Defendants (Newsday,
June 17, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/3BC3-7DPL. See also Jocelyn Simonson, Bail
Nullification, 115 Mich L Rev 585, 599–606 (2017) (describing the growing phenomenon
of community bail funds in detail).
204 See note 14.
205 Marie VanNostrand and Kenneth J. Rose, Pretrial Risk Assessment in Virginia
*3 (Luminosity, May 1, 2009), archived at http://perma.cc/63S7-WNTQ. As I have explained in other work, in the pretrial context, there are constitutional and statutory requirements that call for separate measurements of flight (or nonappearance) risk and
danger. Gouldin, 2016 BYU L Rev at 871–81 (cited in note 16). There are also compelling
policy reasons for disentangling those risks. Id at 885–93.
206 It is worth clarifying that “flight risk” as contemplated in this Article is not the
same as a very high risk of nonappearance. For the reasons outlined in Part IV.A, flight
risk should be treated as a different type of risk than other forms of nonappearance (not
merely as a different degree of the same risk).
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1. Risk factors.
The tools use between seven and fifteen factors,207 but most
tools include the factors found in the federal variant:
(1) “charges pending against the defendant at the time of
arrest”
(2) “number of prior misdemeanor arrests”
(3) “number of prior felony arrests”
(4) “number of prior failures to appear”
(5) “whether the defendant was employed at the time of the
arrest”
(6) “defendant’s residency status”
(7) “whether the defendant suffered from substance abuse
problems”
(8) “nature of the primary charge”
(9) “whether the primary charge was a misdemeanor or a
felony”208
Other tools incorporate additional risk factors, including any
prior violent convictions, whether the defendant was previously
incarcerated, whether a defendant has a working phone, and
demographic indicators like the defendant’s age, mental health,
marital status, citizenship, and education.209
While some risk factors overlap with the statutory factors
discussed in Part II.C, there is one important difference. Legislators incorporating risk factors into bail statutes attempted to
identify factors with a causal relationship to nonappearance—
either factors that provided incentives to flee or factors anchoring defendants to the jurisdiction. Risk-assessment tools, however, generally do not endeavor to identify what causes nonappearance (or recidivism). Instead they seek to identify “what
other [correlative] factors tend to be present” when
nonappearance (or recidivism) occurs.210

207 See Mayson, 127 Yale L J at 510–15 (cited in note 14) (comparing current pretrial risk-assessment tools).
208 Marie VanNostrand and Gena Keebler, Pretrial Risk Assessment in the Federal
Court *5 (Luminosity, Apr 14, 2009), archived at http://perma.cc/8NHF-R63S.
209 See Mayson, 127 Yale L J at 512 (cited in note 14).
210 Jessica Eaglin, Constructing Recidivism Risk, 67 Emory L J 59, 79 (2017) (explaining that for the recidivism-predicting tools used in the sentencing context, tool developers identified predictive factors with a “statistically significant correlation” with
recidivism).
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Studies suggest that the most commonly used tools have
similar “predictive validity.”211 The factors that most current
tools use also “resemble” those highlighted in earlier generations’ risk-prediction studies.212 Many of the same factors appear
in federal and state statutes.213
Risk-assessment tools give a defendant a risk score based on
the defendant’s risk-factor scores (which are weighted differently according to their predictive value) and assign the defendant
to a particular risk category. Most tools do not specify which factors predict nonappearance. The Public Safety Assessment
(PSA) tool (discussed in the next Section) is an exception to that
rule.
2. Shifting away from interviews.
By 2015, less than 10 percent of jurisdictions used actuarial
risk-assessment tools, but that number is rising.214 The cost of
administering some tools is a barrier to widespread adoption
and, as a result, developing less expensive tools is a priority for
those who see risk assessment as the key to bail reform.215 The
PSA tool developed by the Laura and John Arnold Foundation
was designed to respond to those cost concerns.216 The PSA does
not rely on an interview with a defendant, which makes it much
less expensive for jurisdictions to administer (and thus to
adopt).217 The PSA also shifts entirely to static risk factors (that
is, fixed attributes) and away from dynamic risk factors (that
can change and can be the focus of judicial intervention).218
The PSA improves on other tools in several ways. First, it
separately predicts nonappearance and future criminal activity,

211 Nathan James, Risk and Needs Assessment in the Criminal Justice System *3
(Congressional Research Service, June 22, 2015).
212 Vîlcică and Goldkamp, 42 Crim Just & Behav at 1162 (cited in note 81) (reviewing studies of current risk-assessment tools).
213 See notes 132–36 and accompanying text.
214 See Dewan, Judges Replacing Conjecture with Formula for Bail (cited in note 196).
215 Id.
216 Public Safety Assessment (cited in note 22) (noting that the PSA is “far less expensive . . . than previous techniques”). See also Dewan, Judges Replacing Conjecture
with Formula for Bail (cited in note 196) (explaining that part of the appeal is that the
PSA is “designed to be more economical than existing risk assessments”).
217 Public Safety Assessment (cited in note 22).
218 Mayson, 127 Yale L J at 511–12 (cited in note 14) (outlining the risk factors used
in all pretrial tools currently in use). Risk factors that are “static” include, for instance,
having a prior conviction and a history of FTAs, while “dynamic” factors include employment status and substance abuse. Id at 512.
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avoiding a problem that plagues other tools.219 Second, it predicts future violence separately (“new violent criminal activity”) from the much broader category of “new criminal activity.”220 Third, the foundation is more transparent than some
proprietary vendors about how its tool operates.221 Finally, the
PSA is free for jurisdictions to obtain (and as noted above, it is
less expensive to administer).222 As of June 2015, the PSA was
being used in thirty-eight US jurisdictions, including three
states: Arizona, Kentucky, and New Jersey.223
Because it does not rely on a defendant interview, the PSA
does not include many of the traditional statutory factors that
have been incorporated into other risk-assessment tools, including factors like family and community ties, employment, and
residency status.224 Instead, the PSA analyzes factors that can
be ascertained from the defendant’s record, including:
(1) the defendant’s age
(2) whether the current offense is violent
(3) whether the person has a pending charge at the time of
arrest
(4) whether the person has a prior misdemeanor conviction
(5) whether the person has a prior felony conviction
(6) whether the person has a prior conviction for a violent
crime
(7) whether the person failed to appear at a pretrial hearing
in the last two years
(8) whether the person failed to appear at a pretrial hearing
more than two years ago
(9) whether the person has previously been sentenced to
incarceration225

219 Laura and John Arnold Foundation, Public Safety Assessment: Risk Factors and
Formula *2, archived at http://perma.cc/3GHR-GT8P. The problems with combining future dangerousness and flight risk into a single risk measure are discussed in an earlier
article. See Gouldin, 2016 BYU L Rev at 885–89 (cited in note 16).
220 Public Safety Assessment: Risk Factors and Formula at *2 (cited in note 219).
221 See Eaglin, 67 Emory L J at 118–19 (cited in note 210) (arguing for greater
transparency regarding risk-assessment tool inputs and outcomes to “facilitate public
accountability”).
222 Public Safety Assessment: Risk Factors and Formula at *4 (cited in note 219).
223 Public Safety Assessment (cited in note 22). See also text accompanying note 215.
224 Statutory factors are detailed in Part II.C. Risk factors used in other riskassessment tools are outlined in Part III.B.1. See also Public Safety Assessment: Risk
Factors and Formula at *2 (cited in note 219) (listing the risk factors used by PSA).
225 Public Safety Assessment: Risk Factors and Formula at *2 (cited in note 219).

720

The University of Chicago Law Review

[85:677

Four of these factors are used to predict a defendant’s nonappearance risk:226
(1) a pending charge (misdemeanor or felony) earns a defendant one point
(2) a prior misdemeanor or felony conviction earns a defendant one point
(3) a prior FTA that is more than two years old earns a defendant one point
(4) an FTA within the last two years earns two points; for
two or more FTAs in the last two years, the defendant
earns four points
These points are tallied to determine where the defendant will
be placed on the PSA’s six-point FTA scale. The scale ranges
from one, the lowest risk level, to six, the highest. As the foundation has explained, “the likelihood of a negative pretrial outcome increases with each successive point on the scale.”227
Unfortunately, the PSA predicts future nonappearance in only its broadest form. There is no discussion (or prediction) of flight
risk and no distinction made between types of nonappearance.228
All the risk-assessment tools currently being used rely heavily on prior FTAs to generate predictions of future
nonappearance.229 In general, a defendant’s FTA at a court appearance—even if it does not involve willful nonappearance or
flight from the jurisdiction—will give the defendant a recorded
FTA.230 Of all the factors, this will significantly elevate the defendant’s risk of a future FTA, particularly if the prior FTA is
more recent.231 The validation of the tools also overemphasizes
226

Id at *3.
Developing a National Model for Pretrial Risk Assessment at *4 (cited in note 17).
228 See Public Safety Assessment (cited in note 22).
229 See, for example, Public Safety Assessment: Risk Factors and Formula at *2–3
(cited in note 219) (noting that a prior FTA in the past two years is worth twice as much
weight as other factors, such as prior convictions, in calculating a defendant’s risk of
FTA for future court dates). Reliance on prior FTAs to predict a future FTA is based
on studies indicating the strength of nonappearance history in predicting future
nonappearance. See Cohen and Reaves, Pretrial Release of Felony Defendants in State
Courts at *9–10 (cited in note 45) (showing that defendants with a prior FTA were more
likely to fail to appear than defendants with no arrest record and than those with an arrest record but no previous FTA).
230 See, for example, VanNostrand and Keebler, Pretrial Risk Assessment in the
Federal Court at *3 (cited in note 208) (noting that the Bail Reform Act of 1984 identified
the defendant’s “record of appearances at court proceedings” as one factor that courts
should consider).
231 Id at *21.
227
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nonappearance, broadly defined: in order for a defendant to be
deemed a pretrial success, he must appear for all court dates.232
As outlined in more detail in Part IV, merely evaluating broad
nonappearance risk reinforces and exacerbates existing overdetention problems.
C.

Explaining the Omission of Flight

What explains the omission of true flight risk from pretrial
risk-assessment tools? Why have the creators of the tools failed
to distinguish between flight and local (nonflight) forms of nonappearance, or between various types of local nonappearance?233
Historical inattention to these distinctions, and the heritage
of confused, inconsistent terminology may be part of the problem.234 Although some judges and some statutes have tried to
draw meaningful distinctions, the general historical picture is
one of a lack of attention to this pretrial detail. To be fair, conceptions of nonappearance have become more nuanced as the
number of pretrial court appearances and the overall delay in
the pretrial process have increased over time.
Reformers’ preoccupation with perfecting the definition and
prediction of dangerousness may have led them to neglect flight
and other forms of nonappearance risk.235 Pretrial risk assessments have been adapted from tools used in other criminal justice contexts like corrections, in which the risks of a particular
defendant’s future violence and recidivism are primary concerns,
and nonappearance is not part of the risk calculus.236
232

Id at *20 (defining pretrial failure in part as “failing to appear for court”).
There is a growing literature analyzing the methodology of developing riskassessment tools and algorithms for the criminal justice system. See, for example,
Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, The Rise of Big Data Policing: Surveillance, Race, and the
Future of Law Enforcement 136–40 (NYU 2017) (emphasizing the need for greater accountability for tool developers and algorithm builders); Eaglin, 67 Emory L J at 105
(cited in note 210) (“[G]overnment entities and tool developers should adhere to various
accountability measures in the construction of actuarial risk tools.”). See also generally
Michael L. Rich, Machine Learning, Automated Suspicion Algorithms, and the Fourth
Amendment, 164 U Pa L Rev 871 (2016) (focusing on use of machine-learning algorithms
in the Fourth Amendment context).
234 See notes 26–30 and accompanying text (highlighting inconsistent usage of the
terms “flight risk” and “nonappearance risk”).
235 See Wiseman, 84 Geo Wash L Rev at 420–21 (cited in note 15) (describing the
focus in modern bail scholarship on predicting dangerousness and the neglect of flight
risk).
236 See, for example, Edward Latessa, et al, Creation and Validation of the Ohio
Risk Assessment System: Final Report *16 (July 2009), archived at http://perma.cc/7ZZ2
-RHGS (explaining that one key distinction between Ohio’s Pretrial Assessment Tool and
233
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Another explanation is that the tools may not be as objective
and unbiased as they claim. The creators of these riskassessment tools (including some for-profit companies) are concerned with reducing administrative costs so that the tools can
be widely employed. As a result, they have an obvious appetite
for and bias in favor of cheap data.237 Logging an FTA, in some
jurisdictions, is the equivalent of taking attendance, and that bit
of data is readily available.
In addition, broadly defined risk categories are easier to
predict, allowing creators to claim higher success rates. In other
words, because the tools promise only to predict nonappearance
broadly, they can claim greater success than if the tools purported to predict the narrower and more serious categories of risk
(flight risks and local absconding risks) defined in the next
Section. Certainly narrower categories are more difficult to accurately predict, but the greater utility of those predictions
would justify some increase in costs.238
The problem with using readily available data, however, is
that it may simply import existing problems into new contexts.239
Even worse, it may create new problems by falsely inflating the
seriousness of mere nonappearance. As the tools become cemented in judicial decisionmaking and pretrial policymaking,
these problems may become entrenched features. Scholars are
increasingly recognizing the need for actuarial tools and for the

similar tools used in other contexts (such as community supervision, prison intake, and
reentry) is that the former requires prediction of the likelihood of a future FTA). See also
Cecelia Klingele, The Promises and Perils of Evidence-Based Corrections, 91 Notre Dame
L Rev 537, 564–67 (2015) (documenting the embrace of risk-assessment instruments in
the sentencing and corrections contexts).
237 See Solon Barocas and Andrew D. Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate Impact, 104 Cal L
Rev 671, 691 (2016) (explaining that the disparate impact caused by certain tool features
is the product of the creators’ “reasonable priorities as profit seekers”); Eaglin, 67 Emory
L J at 66 (cited in note 210) (explaining that developers’ “desire for cheap, varied, and
easily accessible data” influences the choices they make in constructing risk tools, sometimes in “conflict with a state’s existing sentencing policies and practices”); id at 80 (describing recidivism risk tool developers’ decision to use readily available arrest data as
the measure of recidivism).
238 See Barocas and Selbst, 104 Cal L Rev at 688 (cited in note 237) (explaining that
sometimes the data selected for study “fail[s] to capture enough detail to allow for the
discovery of crucial points of contrast”).
239 See id at 674 (“Approached without care, data mining can reproduce existing
patterns of discrimination, inherit the prejudice of prior decision makers, or simply reflect the widespread biases that persist in society.”); Eaglin, 67 Emory L J at 101–04
(cited in note 210).
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next generation of algorithms to incorporate, from the outset,
accountability for “legal and policy objectives.”240
Finally, as noted above, this flight-focused critique is nested
within a broader literature that challenges the current use of
risk-assessment tools.241 Scholars have raised important concerns about the use of actuarial tools, or in some contexts more
sophisticated machine-learning algorithms, to predict risk in the
criminal justice system.242 The literature includes thorough engagement with the basic underlying questions whether and
when it is appropriate to rely on “statistically sound but nonuniversal generalizations” to draw conclusions about the future
behavior of members of particular groups.243 Others have focused
on the due process and equal protection problems that riskassessment tools present.244

240 Joshua A. Kroll, et al, Accountable Algorithms, 165 U Pa L Rev 633, 640 (2017).
See also id at 678 (highlighting the importance of assuring “fidelity to substantive policy
choices”); Ferguson, The Rise of Big Data Policing at 139 (cited in note 233) (“Accountability rather than transparency provides a way out of the black data opacity problem.
Accountability by design will require big data policing to confront [problems of] bias,
fear, and fair application.”); Eaglin, 67 Emory L J at 105 (cited in note 210) (explaining
that tool developers make decisions in constructing risk-assessment instruments that
“implicate larger normative questions best left for criminal justice experts and the political process to resolve”).
241 The risk typology proposed in Part IV is intended to improve pretrial
decisionmaking, including but not limited to improving the accuracy and utility of riskassessment tool predictions. It does not directly address or cure the critiques briefly described here.
242 Frederick Schauer, Profiles, Probabilities, and Stereotypes 19 (Belknap 2003)
(noting that “many people believe it wrong to make individual decisions on the basis of
nonuniversal group characteristics even if the group attributions have a solid statistical
grounding”). See also Christopher Slobogin, Proving the Unprovable: The Role of Law,
Science, and Speculation in Adjudicating Culpability and Dangerousness 111–13 (Oxford
2007) (defending actuarial predictions of violence risk); Bernard E. Harcourt, Against
Prediction: Profiling, Policing, and Punishing in an Actuarial Age 237 (Chicago 2007)
(arguing that actuarial methods not only “aggravate social disparities,” but might “backfire” and “increase rather than decrease the overall amount of crime in society”).
243 Schauer, Profiles, Probabilities, and Stereotypes at 19 (cited in note 242).
244 See, for example, Sandra G. Mayson, Bias in, Bias out: Criminal Justice Risk
Assessment and the Fantasy of Race Neutrality *32–33 (unpublished manuscript, 2017)
(on file with author); Sonja B. Starr, Evidence-Based Sentencing and the Scientific
Rationalization of Discrimination, 66 Stan L Rev 803, 851 (2014) (critiquing existing
evidence-based regimes and urging approaches that “base actuarial prediction only on
crime characteristics and criminal history” and that strip “socioeconomic and demographic variables”); Hamilton, 52 Am Crim L Rev at 242 (cited in note 190) (analyzing
evidence-based sentencing schemes and determining that the use of socioeconomic and
demographic variables to contribute to a defendant’s sentence may violate the Equal
Protection and Due Process Clauses).
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Even though proponents of the PSA (and other tools) claim
to have avoided the selection of discriminatory factors,245 heavy
reliance on prior nonappearance has a direct and clear impact
on poorer defendants who may lack transportation or childcare
or cannot miss employment.246 In addition, because these tools
heavily weigh prior criminal records, they will disadvantage
those who live in heavily policed communities and who will be
picked up and prosecuted for misdemeanors that fly under the
radar in more affluent neighborhoods.247
IV. A NEW TAXONOMY: DEFINING FLIGHT, DISTINGUISHING
NONAPPEARANCE
Before we can identify what risks we seek to predict and
prevent, we must specify the categories of harms we seek to
avoid. We still know far too little about who fails to appear, why
they fail to appear, and what can be done to remedy that.248 This
Article outlines what ought to be measured so that appropriate
data can be gathered and employed to refine actuarial riskassessment tools, to improve judicial management of pretrial
risks, and to highlight other bail reform priorities.
It bears emphasizing here that the task for judges at the
pretrial stage is one of risk management. Their objective is to
ensure a defendant’s appearance at future court dates. They
must calibrate risks of nonappearance and employ available
conditions of release (or in extreme cases, deny release) to
manage and mitigate those risks. Precision about risk definitions, then, is required so that judges can make appropriate

245 See, for example, Developing a National Model for Pretrial Risk Assessment at *5
(cited in note 17).
246 See notes 270–73 and accompanying text. See also Alexandra Natapoff,
Misdemeanor Decriminalization, 68 Vand L Rev 1055, 1063–65 (2015) (describing challenges for poor defendants navigating the criminal justice system).
247 See Eaglin, 67 Emory L J at 95 (cited in note 210) (“[M]ore frequent contact with
the justice system does not necessarily mean higher risk to the public. Much of this contact comes from heightened scrutiny, not necessarily more criminal wrongdoing.”). See
also note 239 (explaining that, when used improperly, data may simply reproduce existing discrimination).
248 Goldkamp, 11 Crimin & Pub Pol at 430–31 (cited in note 45) (describing the “elusiveness of complete and accurate data relating to fugitives” and explaining that “just
the task of counting fugitives to define the numerators and denominators of potential
effectiveness measures presents difficult challenges”). See also Harmon, 115 Mich L Rev
at 337 (cited in note 69) (“[T]he studies are too few, too limited, and too dated to draw
strong conclusions.”).
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choices from a range of interventions that will manage the
risks presented.
The following sections propose a taxonomy of
nonappearance before outlining research and reform priorities.
First, the category of “true flight,” which includes defendants
who leave the jurisdiction, is treated separately from “local”
nonappearances. Within the remaining category of “local” nonappearances, further distinctions are suggested to isolate a more
serious and costly category of “local absconding” from what is
termed “low-cost nonappearing.”
A.

True Flight

The first subcategory of nonappearances—those defendants
who flee the jurisdiction of arrest—is likely the narrowest of the
subcategories. Because it is based simply on geographic movements, this subcategory is also the easiest to define.249 This
Section details why this group of defendants merits its own subcategory (despite important similarities to the local absconders
discussed below), the issues that presently exist with respect to
collecting data about flight, and the best ways to remedy those
data deficits to make useful and reliable flight predictions.
There are several reasons why we must identify “true flight
risks”—that is, those defendants who pose a high risk of leaving
the jurisdiction—and isolate them from other individuals who
pose risks of what will be termed “local nonappearances” in
the sections that follow. As outlined above, treating all nonappearances the same ignores the long-standing statutory and
doctrinal focus on “flight risk.”250
The judicial, legislative, and scholarly emphasis on flight
risk is not a semantic quirk. It reflects awareness that flight
from the jurisdiction imposes special costs. Although technology
makes it increasingly easy to locate defendants who flee the jurisdiction, administrative headaches and financial realities often
make it difficult to return defendants to the jurisdiction. Notations in the NCIC database indicate whether a state or local ju249 Although data about who flees the jurisdiction are not presently collected and
analyzed in the way envisioned by this paper, it may not be particularly difficult to begin
to gather relevant statistics. At present, “fugitives are selected into the [US Marshals
Service] in part based on the presumption of an offender having crossed state or national
boundaries.” David M. Bierie and Paul J. Detar, Geographic and Social Movement of Sex
Offender Fugitives, 62 Crime & Delinq 983, 997 (2016).
250 See Part II.B (statutes); Part II.C (cases).
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risdiction is willing to pay for extradition and under what circumstances. Two factors, among others, determine the jurisdiction’s willingness: the distance a defendant travels from the jurisdiction and the seriousness of the offense.251 Many
jurisdictions stop trying to retrieve defendants who have fled the
jurisdiction, particularly if they are not found in a border state
or if they have been charged with a less serious offense.252 For
defendants accused of lower-level offenses, it is plausible that
the community may not view flight as particularly problematic
and, as noted below, the community may elect to spend few resources attempting to locate such defendants. Here again,
judges should be encouraged to adjust their risk tolerance, as
detaining low-level defendants to prevent flight is a poor allocation of resources.253
Tools should also measure flight risk apart from other nonappearance risks because the possibility of flight suggests different judicial interventions. For example, judges may impose
travel restrictions or confiscate travel documents from defendants who pose flight risks. Judges faced with defendants who
are flight risks may (particularly for defendants charged with
more serious offenses) be able to justify using more aggressive
forms of community supervision, GPS monitoring, house arrest,
or, in extreme cases, detention. Given its high costs (both for the
individuals being jailed and for the community), detention
should be reserved for those who cannot be prevented or dissuaded from leaving the jurisdiction using less intrusive interventions.254 Judges use a range of tools to prevent released defendants from fleeing the jurisdiction and to incentivize them to
return to court, including imposing financial conditions, super-

251 Brad Heath, The Ones That Get Away (USA Today, Mar 11, 2014), archived at
http://perma.cc/STF7-A77D (explaining that notations in the NCIC database indicate
whether the jurisdiction of initial arrest is willing to pay to extradite the defendant).
252 See id.
253 See notes 174–76 and accompanying text.
254 The Bail Reform Act, for example, imposes obligations on judges to order release
of defendants “subject to the least restrictive further condition, or combination of conditions,” that would ensure their appearances. 18 USC § 3142(c)(1)(B). The appropriateness of pretrial detention to manage public-safety risk (as opposed to nonappearance
risk) is beyond the scope of this Article. See Baradaran and McIntyre, 90 Tex L Rev at
526–29 (cited in note 24) (analyzing predictions of pretrial dangerousness). See also
Shima Baradaran Baughman, Costs of Pretrial Detention, 97 BU L Rev 1, 19 (2017)
(comparing the costs associated with pretrial public-safety risk with the costs of pretrial
detention).
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vision conditions, travel restrictions, and, in some cases, the use
of electronic monitoring.255
Typically, in order to flee, defendants need resources.256 This
category of true flight, then, will likely encompass wealthier defendants than other nonappearing defendants (who remain in
the jurisdiction). That resource divide may be useful both for
predictive sorting purposes and for developing means of preventing flight. Although broad, indiscriminate use of money bail often leads to detention for indigent defendants, scholars should
study and evaluate whether selectively applying financial conditions can effectively discourage flight for released defendants
who have resources.257
Over time, technology and improved interjurisdictional coordination have diminished the prospect of successful flight.258
The FBI’s NCIC database facilitates rapid information
sharing.259 For high-profile suspects, shows like America’s Most
Wanted significantly increase the likelihood of apprehension.260
For other defendants, internet mug shots make it difficult to
hide.261 Professor Wiseman explains that “technological advances
in tracking and monitoring defendants” have meant that “there
is no longer as high a likelihood of avoiding conviction by escap-

255 Gouldin, 2016 BYU L Rev at 894–95 (cited in note 16) (describing conditions of
release that manage nonappearance risk).
256 Legislatures and courts have long recognized this connection; a defendant’s financial resources are a listed federal statutory factor. 18 USC § 3142(g)(3)(A). See also
notes 172–76 and accompanying text. See also Why It Matters (Uptrust), archived at
http://perma.cc/9XY2-ZNUJ (“When poor people miss court, they do not flee.”).
257 There is at least one decades-old study that suggests that money bail deters
flight for released defendants. See Samuel L. Myers Jr, The Economics of Bail Jumping,
10 J Legal Stud 381, 395 (1981) (finding that setting higher bail discouraged flight
among released defendants).
258 Wiseman, 123 Yale L J at 1352–53 (cited in note 29). See also Harmon, 115 Mich
L Rev at 339–40 (cited in note 69) (explaining that technology makes it increasingly easy
to locate a suspect if he fails to appear); id (describing the “extensive digital trail” created by the use of “credit cards, bank cards, electronic benefits transfer (EBT) cards,
monthly transit cards, electronic tolling devices (like FasTrak and EZPass), and many
other location-based services and devices,” in addition to cell phones).
259 Unfortunately, use of the database is not universal. See Law Enforcement
Information
Sharing
(Information
Sharing
Environment),
archived
at
http://perma.cc/THB7-MVHN.
260 Miles, 48 J L & Econ at 281 (cited in note 80) (“[E]stimates show that broadcasting a fugitive’s profile on America’s Most Wanted substantially raises the apprehension
hazard by a factor of seven and shortens the expected fugitive spell by roughly a
fourth.”).
261 Wiseman, 123 Yale L J at 1352–53 (cited in note 29).
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ing across a state or county line, as the police will eventually detect and track down the defendant.”262
Unfortunately, although courts and commentators frequently describe nonappearance risk in terms of “flight,” the data
rarely segregate flight from other FTAs. There are reports and
studies that purport to isolate data about “fugitives” from other
nonappearance data, but those reports and studies generally do
not use the term “fugitives” to refer to fleeing defendants.263
Some studies of flight behavior show how we can gather
more data about defendants who flee the jurisdiction. Although
limited, these studies offer preliminary insights into where fleeing defendants may be most likely to go and how they behave.
For example, based on a recent study of alleged sex offenders
who unlawfully crossed federal, state, or tribal lines, for example, Professor Bierie and Paul Detar found that “fugitives who
live alone choose familiar areas, and those who go to an unfamiliar location tend to reside with friends, partners, or family.”264
Bierie and Detar concluded that “fugitives often need some connection to the life they had prior to their warrant—few can truly
disappear to seek a new life wholly unconnected with their prior
one.”265 Bierie and Detar’s study is one of the few to study “flight
behavior,” including “the distance offenders traveled, whether
they lived alone or with others at capture, and whether they
were arrested in a community they were familiar with (e.g., a
city they had lived in before).”266

262

Id at 1362.
Cohen and Reaves, Pretrial Release of Felony Defendants in State Courts at *7
(cited in note 45); Cohen Email (cited in note 47) (explaining that the term “fugitives”
included defendants who “remained in the local jurisdiction”). See also Helland and
Tabarrok, 47 J L & Econ at 109 (cited in note 57) (“Those [defendants] who remain at
large more than 1 year are called fugitives.”).
264 Bierie and Detar, 62 Crime & Delinq at 996 (cited in note 249).
265 Id.
266 Id at 983. Bierie and Detar found that 37 percent of the offenders in their study
263

fled to a familiar area, 65% lived with friends or family at capture, and 50%
traveled more than 370 miles (with 35% residing in an adjacent state to the
last known address). Analyses also showed that these three outcomes varied as
a function of offender demographics, geographic history, social networks, and
criminal history.
Id.
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The Nuances of “Local” Nonappearance

Even after isolating “local” nonappearances from flight, further distinctions ought to be drawn between two types of local
nonappearance:
what
this
Article
terms
“low-cost
nonappearance” and “local absconding.” The distinctions between these categories turn on the intent of defendants,267 the
persistence or duration of their nonappearances, the preventability of their FTAs, and the costs imposed by their
nonappearances—that is, the costs of returning these defendants to court through rearrest or other means.268
1. Low-cost nonappearance.
The problem with an overly broad definition of
nonappearance is that it lumps comparatively minor forms of
nonappearance together with much more serious and costly
nonappearance problems. This conflation raises the question:
How do these purportedly minor nonappearances differ from
what is termed “local absconding” below? The key differences,
outlined here, turn on: (i) why defendants who fall into this category fail to appear; (ii) what interventions might improve their
appearance rates; and (iii) the cost of returning these defendants
to court if they do fail to appear. All of these distinctions focus
on the differences in the costs that these nonappearances impose
on the system.
a) Explanations/purpose. These low-cost nonappearances
include defendants who fail to appear for a range of different
reasons, including: being unaware of or forgetting the date of the
court appearance (which might reflect either ineffective notice
by the court or poor calendar management by the defendant);
illness or other unforeseen personal emergencies; external logistical challenges including employment conflicts, childcare issues,
or lack of transportation; confusion or ignorance about the process or a general lack of capacity to navigate the process (this
may reflect the complexity of the system and/or the defendant’s
cognitive limitations); fear of punishment relating to the pend-

267 The intent of a defendant is not being gauged as a measure of culpability. Instead, it functions as a sort of proxy for the likelihood of assuring future appearances
and the costs of recovering or locating defendants who do not appear.
268 It is worth noting that the seriousness of the offense of arrest is discussed
throughout this Part as it intersects with each of the proposed categories. It is not, however, used to define the categories.
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ing charge; or lacking the funds to pay fines and fees that are
owed at the courthouse.269 Judges have different means of addressing each of these underlying causes, and it is easy to anticipate that a judge trying to manage this type of nonappearance
risk might approach the endeavor with a checklist to determine
what interventions to employ.
Criminologists are increasingly drawing similar distinctions
between who they describe as “active flaunters” and
“inadvertent absconders.”270 As Professor John Goldkamp explains, defendants who fail to appear for court include the “active flaunters as well as inadvertent absconders who did not
miss their court requirements through intentional actions—
rather, they may have been confused or lost in the courts.”271
Professors Daniel Flannery and Jeff Kretschmar elaborate
on the same idea, explaining that at least some nonappearing
defendants “may just not have the capacity or competence to
show up at court hearings at the required place and time.”272
When individuals who fail to appear inadvertently or for other
nonwillful reasons are lumped in with other “fugitives” and
“flight risks,” there is clear potential for mismanagement of the
risks that are actually present. The risk-assessment tools described above make that precise mistake.
While the “inadvertent” nonappearances envisioned by
Goldkamp are certainly part of the category proposed here, that
label is too narrow. As the examples provided above make clear,
some of the defendants who fall into the low-cost category proposed here are deliberate (and not inadvertent) nonappearances.
One might be tempted to label the entire category “excusable” nonappearances, but that term is problematic because it
may not align with current court practices regarding excusing
FTAs. As noted in Part IV.C below, however, adjusting current

269 See Harmon, 115 Mich L Rev at 338 (cited in note 69) (discussing the “familiar
and manageable” reasons defendants might fail to appear). See also Why It Matters (cited in note 256) (contending that poor defendants who “miss court” do so “because they
lack transportation, could not take time off work, had to care for their children, or simply
don’t keep a good calendar”).
270 Goldkamp, 11 Crimin & Pub Pol at 429–30 (cited in note 45) (asserting that
these ideas are implied in Flannery and Kretschmar’s study of the Fugitive Safe
Surrender program). See also Bierie, 79 Fed Probation at 27–28 (cited in note 48) (drawing similar distinction between “unintentional” and “intentional” fugitives).
271 Goldkamp, 11 Crimin & Pub Pol at 429 (cited in note 45).
272 Flannery and Kretschmar, 11 Crimin & Pub Pol at 451–52 (cited in note 54).
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court practices is a key part of this Article’s proposed reform
agenda.
b) Preventability. Appearance rates are distinctively
“malleable” for defendants in this subcategory.273 For example,
studies show that reminding defendants or their families of
court dates can significantly reduce FTAs.274 In a 2011 study, researchers reviewed studies that evaluated various court reminder systems for low-level defendants who received citations.275
Another study found that, by providing reminders to those defendants, the court system was able to reduce the FTA rate
“from 25 percent in the control group to six percent in the reminder group when the caller spoke directly to the defendant, 15
percent when a message was left with another person, and 21
percent when a message was left on an answering service.”276
Other studies have also reported “immediate and dramatic
improvements” with implementing similar reminder and notification procedures.277 Some jurisdictions also “take advantage of
each and every contact with [released] defendants to remind
them of their obligations,” by ensuring, for example, that staff at
drug testing facilities also remind defendants when required
court appearances are looming.278 Administrators of one notification program in San Mateo, California, report that most FTAs
are not willful and that logistical and practical issues underlie
the majority of FTAs (for example, lost paperwork, lack of contact information, and fear to ask questions, among others).279

273 Harmon, 115 Mich L Rev at 337–38 (cited in note 69) (describing the “malleab[ility]” of appearance rates for defendants who are issued citations instead of being
arrested).
274 Bornstein, et al, 19 Psychology, Pub Pol & L at 76 (cited in note 54) (discussing
test results which “show[ed] that a reminder effectively reduces the FTA rate”). See also
Marie VanNostrand, Kenneth J. Rose, and Kimberly Weibrecht, State of the Science of
Pretrial Release Recommendations and Supervision *20 (Pretrial Justice Institute, June
2011), archived at http://perma.cc/QFK5-8UGG (summarizing studies of notifications in
different jurisdictions and noting that “[a]ll of the studies concluded that court date notifications in some form are effective at reducing failures to appear in court”).
275 VanNostrand, Rose, and Weibrecht, State of the Science at *15–20 (cited in
note 274).
276 Subramanian, et al, Incarceration’s Front Door, at *33–34 (cited in note 4) (describing data from Coconino County, Arizona). See also VanNostrand, Rose, and
Weibrecht, State of the Science at *17–18 (cited in note 274).
277 Barry Mahoney, et al, Pretrial Services Programs: Responsibilities and Potential
*39 (National Institute of Justice, Mar 2001), archived at http://perma.cc/7L3C-F5XM.
278 Id at *40 (describing a program in the District of Columbia).
279 Id at *39:
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Jurisdictions also report improved appearance rates when
community organizations and networks are engaged in creative
and novel ways to help ensure that defendants are aware of appearance dates and able to appear when required.280 A startup
company called Uptrust is currently marketing to county governments a “behavioral science-driven SMS reminder service”
that will increase court appearance rates and therefore lead
to reductions in the use of pretrial detention to manage nonappearance risk.281
There are other tools that judges can use to discourage or
prevent FTAs, including improving access to high-quality
substance abuse treatment and improving pretrial services
support. In Part IV.C, various systemic changes are proposed,
all of which will improve appearance rates among this group
of defendants.
Pretrial detention and more aggressive forms of community
supervision are unnecessary for defendants who could be
nudged back to court on the appointed day with a simple and
inexpensive reminder.
c) Low costs. Even if some of these nonappearances cannot be prevented, they can be viewed as low-cost events for at
least two reasons. First, the injury or harm that these individuals inflict on the system is less serious. While those who flee or
abscond “harm the public by preventing the operation of its
criminal justice system,” defendants who fall into the category of
low-cost nonappearances impose shorter-term administrative
burdens.282 Thinking in terms of the “justice costs” described
above, these defendants, while clearly “annoying” contributors to
an already inefficient system, are not likely to evade justice
permanently.283
[M]any failures to appear can be averted by reminding the defendants of their
upcoming court appointments. . . . We have had a positive effect on both defendants and the criminal justice system by explaining to these individuals
how the system works, answering their questions, and explaining the importance of coming to court.
280 See Simonson, 115 Mich L Rev at 634 (cited in note 203) (describing appearance
rates of defendants whose release is funded by community bail funds).
281 Uptrust (AngelList), online at http://angel.co/uptrust (visited Nov 10, 2017) (Perma
archive unavailable). See also What We Do (Uptrust), archived at http://perma.cc/726W
-TNXB (“Through a mix of automation and on-demand human interaction we humanize
the confusing criminal justice process for low-income defendants.”).
282 Russell M. Gold, Jail as Injunction *32–33 (unpublished manuscript, 2017) (on
file with author).
283 Id. See also notes 79–87 and accompanying text.
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In addition, returning a nonappearing defendant to court is
likely to be a relatively low-cost proposition if that person is not
actively and persistently avoiding the courthouse, like the true
flight examples described above and the local absconders described below. First, courts should attempt to resolve FTAs
without penalties by simply advising the suspect of the missed
court date and urging a prompt return to court.284 As noted
above, some jurisdictions already take this approach by not formally recording an FTA until steps have been taken to alert a
defendant of the missed appearance and the no-cost opportunity
to correct it.285
Even if a phone call does not work, if a nonappearing defendant can be readily located and approached, then pretrial detention is an unnecessary, expensive, and oppressive way to
prevent that type of nonappearance.286 Policymakers looking to
reduce pretrial incarceration should weigh the costs and availability of other mechanisms for ensuring that these defendants
return to court.287
284 Professor Rachel Harmon cites a study of defendants who failed to appear after
being issued a citation that suggests that this would be a promising approach. Harmon,
115 Mich L Rev at 338 (cited in note 69) (“In one study, over half of the failures to appear
were solved by continuing the case for a week and informing the suspect of the new day,
with no additional penalty for the initial failure to appear.”). See also Schnacke,
Fundamentals of Bail at *104 (cited in note 100) (citing a different study that examined
the same question).
285 Based on survey data collected from 112 of the 150 most populous counties in the
United States, the Pretrial Justice Institute (PJI) found that 69 percent of respondents
“report that staff of a pre-trial services program or similar entity make an effort to contact defendants and urge them to return to court voluntarily.” Survey of County Pretrial
Release Policies at *10 (cited in note 50). Of those jurisdictions that attempt to contact
defendants, 68 percent make telephone calls, 36 percent send letters, and 16 percent
make home visits. Id. See also Mahoney, et al, Pretrial Services Programs:
Responsibilities and Potential at *40 (cited in note 277) (“Pretrial services programs that
have established specialized failure-to-appear units universally report that most wayward defendants are not ‘on the lam’ but, rather, can be quickly reached at home or
work.”).
286 The average cost of detaining a defendant pretrial is approximately $19,253.
VanNostrand and Keebler, Pretrial Risk Assessment in the Federal Court at *36 (cited in
note 208). In New York City, the daily cost of detaining a defendant pretrial is approximately $123 per day. See Cost of Pre-trial Detention in City Jails Takes Bite out of Big
Apple’s
Budget
(NYC
Independent
Budget
Office),
archived
at
http://perma.cc/8DVX-VYY6. See also Wiseman, 123 Yale L J at 1372–74 (cited in
note 29) (gathering daily cost statistics and comparing different types of supervision). In
the federal prison system, the daily cost of pretrial detention is $73.03. Supervision Costs
Significantly Less than Incarceration in Federal System (US Courts, July 18, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/WD45-B4M2.
287 See, for example, Vera Institute of Justice, Bail Bond Supervision in Three
Counties: Report on Intensive Pretrial Supervision in Nassau, Bronx, and Essex Counties
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Of course, even short-term nonappearances trigger nuisance
costs. These include the administrative costs of rescheduling
court dates and the wasted time of court personnel and attorneys when court dates are rescheduled.288 Once a defendant fails
to appear, the government may also incur some expense locating
and rearresting defendants.289 Time spent locating and
rearresting defendants who fail to appear on their own volition
imposes opportunity costs, as well. Those officers could be
spending that time on other investigations and endeavors.
Although jurisdictions with arrest warrant backlogs complain of an inability to serve outstanding warrants due to a “lack
of manpower,”290 that complaint seems flawed. It is likely that it
is still more costly to detain defendants in this category than to
locate them, so the manpower issue is one of resource allocation
(and not truly a claim that the costs of rearrest are higher than
the costs of detention). The resource allocation problem could reflect either red tape and bureaucracy problems or, perhaps more
likely, the fact that many outstanding warrants are issued for
offenses that are simply not a high enough priority to justify any
additional resource expenditure. Professor Rachel Harmon
asserts that “much of the time, no one bothers to hunt for suspects who fail to appear, though that is often because they were
not worth charging with a crime in the first place.”291
These distinctions are useful as interventions are considered. As Goldkamp explains, the distinctions suggest that “sanctioning and threat may not serve effectively as the all-purpose
response relevant in all cases.”292 As Professor Tabarrok has explained, adopting a “behavioral perspective” would permit courts
*15–16 (Aug 1995), archived at http://perma.cc/JJ7T-4ZJT. The Vera report cites a 1992
study in which researchers found that, when under intensive supervision, defendants
released pretrial had an FTA rate of 0.7 percent. Id at *16. In the same year, a similar
study of defendants released from jail “with no consistent supervision pending the disposition of their cases” found that those defendants who were released unsupervised had
an FTA rate of 42 percent. Id.
288 Helland and Tabarrok, 47 J L & Econ at 94 (cited in note 57) (“Defendants who
fail to appear impose significant costs on others. Direct costs include the costs of rearranging and rescheduling court dates, the wasted time of judges, lawyers, and other
court personnel, and the costs necessary to find and apprehend or rearrest fugitives.”).
289 Id.
290 Id at 98.
291 Harmon, 115 Mich L Rev at 340 (cited in note 69). See also notes 67–71 and accompanying text.
292 Goldkamp, 11 Crimin & Pub Pol at 431 (cited in note 45) (asserting that these ideas are implied in Flannery and Kretschmar’s study of the Fugitive Safe Surrender program), citing Flannery and Kretschmar, 11 Crimin & Pub Pol at 456 (cited in note 54).

2018]

Defining Flight Risk

735

to view “crime control as less about punishing rational actors
and more about helping criminogenic people to overcome their
behavioral biases, thereby avoiding crime and the sequence of
choices and events that inexorably leads to imprisonment and
downfall.”293
2. Local absconding.
Of course, not all local FTAs are cheaply or easily prevented
or remedied. Although imperfect, the lines between the low-cost
nonappearances described above and the “local absconders” category described below reflect a combination of the willfulness,
persistence, and higher costs associated with preventing and
managing these nonappearances.
a) Willfulness. Some nonappearing defendants actively
and willfully avoid court and hide from law enforcement. Simple
reminders are unlikely to bring them back to court. Even if they
lack the resources to leave the jurisdiction, some defendants will
actively work to “evade capture,” making “specific and strategic”
choices to avoid detection, including, for example, “avoiding
some forms of employment, choosing not to apply for public benefits, or otherwise limiting their interaction with formal institutions that could signal their location to authorities.”294 As this
description immediately makes clear, the conduct of these local
absconders creates a host of cascading problems for them and for
their communities.295
The true flight risks described above are similarly willful—
they act intentionally and with a purpose to thwart the judicial
process to avoid prosecution and punishment. The key distinction between these two groups is geographic. As noted above,
fleeing the jurisdiction imposes costs and problems that distinguish it from local absconding. Members of the latter group are

293

Tabarrok, 11 Crimin & Pub Pol at 466–67 (cited in note 91).
Bierie and Detar, 62 Crime & Delinq at 985 (cited in note 249). See also Flannery
and Kretschmar, 11 Crimin & Pub Pol at 439 (cited in note 54).
295 Bierie and Detar have explained that defendants who are actively hiding from
law enforcement to “avoid capture” struggle to meet other “core needs,” including “access
to shelter, income, safety, and social or emotional support.” Bierie and Detar, 62 Crime
& Delinq at 986 (cited in note 249). Because “traditional avenues to meeting these needs
are often inhibited or blocked,” these defendants are forced to seek out alternative, often
criminal arrangements, and they “experience increased risk of physical danger and risk
of exploitation because . . . [of their] inability to seek protection from police or courts.” Id.
See also notes 86–95 and accompanying text.
294
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easier and less expensive to find than defendants who have fled
the jurisdiction.
Relying on willfulness is not a new premise. Some jurisdictions use willfulness to determine whether an FTA will be excused and whether a defendant who fails to appear forfeits his
bail.296 For these reasons, there is a temptation to call this category “willful nonappearances.” But willfulness of an initial nonappearance is sometimes defined broadly by courts (and might
capture some of the low-cost nonappearances described above).
And deliberately missing a court date does not quite capture the
problems presented by this category. For example, a defendant
who deliberately misses court in order to keep his job belongs in
the low-cost nonappearance bucket. A defendant who deliberately misses court to evade justice is properly categorized as a local
absconder. Considering persistence and cost in combination with
willfulness helps to narrow this category appropriately.
b) Persistence. Nonappearances with a longer duration
(that is, more persistent nonappearances) impose greater
costs on the community than short-term nonappearances.
Why does persistence matter? Certainly, as time passes, the
more intangible costs of failing to secure justice for the underlying offense might be viewed as increasing.297 The direct costs
of a nonappearing defendant increase over time, as well.298
We have not adequately invested in identifying the defendants who frequently become persistent nonappearances,
but the data regarding persistence are available, so this work
could be done with some ease. For example, in their analysis of
data about pretrial release of state felony defendants, Thomas
Cohen and Brian Reaves used the term “fugitive” to refer to
“anyone who missed a court appearance but could not be found
(e.g., brought back to court) within the one year study coverage
period.”299

296 See, for example, Ark Code Ann § 16-84-203(a) (excusing defendants for failing to
appear when prevented by illness or by detention in a jail or correctional facility).
297 This assumes that justice delayed for a long time imposes greater costs on the
community than swift or merely briefly delayed justice. The assumption does not seem
particularly controversial because the swiftness of punishment is relevant to both the
retributive and the utilitarian goals of punishment.
298 See Part I.C.
299 Cohen Email (cited in note 47). See also Cohen and Reaves, Pretrial Release of
Felony Defendants in State Courts at *8–10 (cited in note 45) (discussing the “fugitive
rate” during their one-year study).
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Although persistence is relevant and seems easy to track, it
poses some problems and, like willfulness, should not be the sole
criterion for prioritizing risks among local nonappearances.
Principally, there is nothing in Cohen and Reaves’ data that indicates the efforts made to notify, locate, and bring back to court
the particular defendants.300 The passage of time may be some
indication of the evasiveness of a defendant, which would be
helpful for a risk manager to know. But it may also reflect the
disinterest of the jurisdiction. That, in turn, may be a function of
several issues: (i) how difficult it is (or would be) to find the defendant; (ii) that the charged offense is not serious enough to
justify the expenditure of effort to recover the defendant; or
(iii) the weakness of the state’s case (even for more serious
charges). Here again, these different explanations for the persistence of the nonappearance would suggest different interventions (or perhaps no intervention at all). Time, while relevant,
cannot be the only categorical determinant. Combined with willfulness (described above) and higher costs (described next), it
narrows our category of local absconders.
c) Higher costs. Defendants who willfully fail to appear
and who do so for extended periods of time (or indefinitely) have
been described as the “Achilles heel” of law enforcement.301 Particularly when “local absconders” have been charged with more
serious crimes, their nonappearances impose greater justice
costs. The costs of locating defendants who are actively hiding is
higher. Locating these defendants is possible but likely more
“resource intensive” than locating defendants in the low-cost
category.302 For this group, then, more aggressive conditions of
release might be warranted.
C.

A Research and Reform Agenda

This Article’s new taxonomy is a preliminary step. Because
this taxonomy has not been formally recognized, gathering data
about these new categories is an immediate priority. In addition,
the definition of categories highlights systemic reforms that will
300 See generally Cohen and Reaves, Pretrial Release of Felony Defendants in State
Courts (cited in note 45).
301 Senate Hearings on Fugitives, 106th Cong, 2d Sess at 1 (cited in note 74). In a
2000 hearing, Senator Strom Thurmond of the Senate Committee on Criminal Justice
Oversight explained that “[f]ugitives represent not only an outrage to the rule of law,
they are also a serious threat to public safety.” Id.
302 Harmon, 115 Mich L Rev at 340–41 (cited in note 69).
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immediately reduce nonappearance rates. The final Section of
this Article briefly sketches a research and reform agenda.
Reformers must gather and analyze data about the number
of defendants who might fall into each category and the interventions that best manage these distinct risks.303 This task will
include: (i) collecting more data about true flight and local absconding to develop risk predictions for these more serious categories of nonappearances; (ii) collecting more data about which
risk-management tools most effectively—and least intrusively—
manage and prevent all forms of nonappearance; and (iii) better
managing the creation of FTA data at the front end of the process, including, for example, suggesting best practices across jurisdictions about when FTAs are logged. Prior studies drawing
some of the distinctions proposed here demonstrate that this research and analysis is feasible.304 This Article illustrates that the
work is also required by federal and state constitutions, statutes, and as a matter of effective policymaking.
A shift to risk management (and beyond risk measurement)
also highlights the need to change aspects of the system to reduce nonappearances. Differentiating between risks will force
self-reflection for a criminal justice system that is complicit in
the nonappearance problem. While it is certainly appropriate to
focus principally on alleged offenders in developing a new nonappearance risk taxonomy (as the previous parts have done),
there are also opportunities to reduce rates of nonappearance—
principally among the broadest category of low-cost
nonappearances—by pursuing systemic changes. Those changes
should occur along at least five fronts.
First, the system’s complexity makes it difficult to navigate,
particularly for defendants who may have “lower levels of education and IQ than the general population.”305 Judges within the
system can work to simplify the process for the defendants who

303 See Goldkamp, 11 Crimin & Pub Pol at 431 (cited in note 45) (calling for “better
descriptive data” about fugitives and observing that “[t]ypes of fugitives can be identified
that call possibly for a range of different responses, both preventive and reactive, that
target specifically the different problems associated with each type”).
304 See notes 55, 56, 287 and accompanying text.
305 Tabarrok, 11 Crimin & Pub Pol at 468 (cited in note 91):

Despite the difficulty of navigation, the criminal justice system can be unforgiving to those who fail to meet its dictates. Simplifying the process and offering one-stop shopping is not only more just, but it also means that punishment
is more swift and certain, a benefit both for the defendants and for society.
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appear before them,306 or they can adjust their expectations and
make appropriate accommodations.
Second, studies suggest that nonappearance rates increase
as court delays increase.307 Reducing unnecessary delays must
be a priority. In jurisdictions with bloated criminal court dockets
and lengthy backlogs,308 high rates of nonappearance may not be
surprising. Defendants may be expected to return to court frequently, “spend[ing] all day waiting for their cases to be called,
only to be told that the proceedings are being put off for another
month.”309 Addressing these dysfunctional court backlogs and
reducing the time between an arrest and the resolution of a
criminal case may help reduce rates of nonappearance.310
The third proposed system intervention allows for increased
flexibility in scheduling court appearances. In prior studies,
courts that permit appearances on weekends and evenings have
seen increases in appearance rates.311 Even without opening the

306

Id at 469. See also notes 311–12 and accompanying text.
See Mary T. Phillips, The Past, Present, and Possible Future of Desk Appearance
Tickets in New York City *42, 72 (NYC Criminal Justice Agency, Mar 2014), archived at
http://perma.cc/M88D-MW5B (describing results from a study of appearance rates for
desk appearance tickets issued in New York City, finding a “strong association between
FTA and arrest-to-arraignment time,” and concluding that “FTA rates, although already
far lower than in previous decades, could be reduced further by scheduling arraignments
more quickly following the arrest”).
308 For example, a 2016 federal class-action lawsuit filed by the Bronx Defenders
indicated that the average pending age of misdemeanor cases at the end of 2015 was 827
days. Amended Complaint, Trowbridge v DiFiore, Civil Action No 16-3455, *24 (SDNY
filed Jan 23, 2017). This litigation is currently stayed pending settlement negotiations.
Trowbridge v. Cuomo (Bronx Defenders, June 27, 2016), archived at
http://perma.cc/ML9J-H4AH.
309 A Nightmare Worthy of Dickens (NY Times, May 12, 2016), online at
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/12/opinion/a-nightmare-court-worthy-of-dickens.html
(visited Nov 11, 2017) (Perma archive unavailable) (characterizing the Bronx criminal
courts as a “horribly managed court system that has neither the resources nor the incentive to move any faster”).
310 Although concern about court backlogs and delays has prompted some speedytrial reforms, it is not clear how effective these reforms will be. The bail reforms that
took effect in New Jersey at the beginning of 2017, for example, included New Jersey’s
first speedy-trial rule. In New York, Kalief’s Law, legislation proposed to amend New
York’s speedy-trial rules, is currently pending in the state senate. Squadron Passes 1st
Step in Speedy Trial Reform through Codes Committee (NY State Senate, June 6, 2017),
archived at http://perma.cc/5MPL-S4Q4.
311 See Tabarrok, 11 Crimin & Pub Pol at 469 (cited in note 91) (concluding that the
“popularity” of the Saturday surrender option in the Fugitive Safe Surrender program
“indicates that many fugitives have jobs that they do not want to lose” and demonstrates
that “a more flexible criminal justice system could better help individuals to reintegrate
with civil society”). See also id (describing a 1990s night-court “experiment” in Cook
307
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court at those times, courts might adopt more accommodating
approaches to scheduling and rescheduling future appearances
if necessary.312 Criminal courts might also consider permitting
defendants to appear remotely.313
Courts must also adjust their responses to nonappearance.
For the reasons outlined above, immediately logging an FTA
and issuing a bench warrant is not an effective strategy for addressing nonappearance, particularly for low-level offenders.314
In addition, courts must eliminate the imposition of fines
and fees on those who cannot afford to pay them, and should
consider taking these steps as part of broader amnesty efforts
for defendants who fail to appear.315 Too many defendants indicate that they cannot afford to return to court due to steep court
fees and fines to clear warrants.316 The Department of Justice’s
2015 report on Ferguson described the Ferguson municipal
court’s “focus on revenue generation” as leading to “court practices that violate the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process and
equal protection requirements.”317 In particular, the report
singled out the issuing of municipal arrest warrants “as a routine response to missed court appearances” intended to generate
financial benefits for the court, in part because each additional
missed appearance triggered more fines and fees.318 Former
County, Illinois, in which “disposition time fell from 245 days to 86 days, and the number
of court dates per case fell from 11 to just over 6”).
312 See id (“Whether through night courts, weekend courts, or otherwise, simplifying
and speeding up the criminal justice system could improve both justice and efficiency.”).
See also Summons Reform (cited in note 73) (describing summons reform efforts in New
York City, including both greater clarity about how and when to respond to a summons
and broadening the “window within which to satisfy the summons”).
313 CourtCall, a vendor that provides remote-access services for courthouses, explains that its “remote video technology provides motorists the opportunity to save time
and costs by being heard remotely and creates greater efficiencies for the courts and law
enforcement. More importantly, those contesting traffic citations need not be required to
miss work, school or family obligations.” What Is CourtCall (CourtCall), archived at
http://perma.cc/H7AL-PPAD (emphasis omitted).
314 This summer, the New York City Mayor’s Office of Criminal Justice announced a
“warrants campaign” to research and implement “the best way to encourage individuals
to come to court and clear their warrants.” Warrants Campaign (City Record Online,
June 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/C5HK-BTPV.
315 Flannery and Kretschmar, 11 Crimin & Pub Pol at 439 (cited in note 54) (describing the role of broad amnesty efforts in clearing backlogs and returning some defendants
to the process).
316 Cahill, 11 Crimin & Pub Pol at 476 (cited in note 58) (“Court fees and other fines
required to clear a warrant can also represent a financial hardship on some individuals
and families, and it could be the root cause of leaving a warrant outstanding.”).
317 Investigation of the Ferguson Police Department at *3 (cited in note 71).
318 Id.
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President Barack Obama described the role that these sorts of
“user fees” play in “consigning those who cannot afford to pay to
a cycle of debt, incarceration, and prolonged poverty.”319
The final system-focused intervention is less an independent
proposal and more a byproduct of using the taxonomy and implementing the other interventions proposed here. The proposed
taxonomy requires considering the different circumstances that
lead to nonappearance. That inquiry may foster greater judicial
and system-wide awareness of the competency, capacity, and resource limitations that inhibit compliance with court orders.
Ideally, greater awareness will increase investment in flexible
schedules or transportation and childcare accommodations that
might increase appearance rates. In this way, requiring judges
to inquire about—and strategize to address—the reasons for
nonappearance could humanize the process and improve system
outcomes.
CONCLUSION
This country’s uniquely swollen jail population and new
economic reality have created a fiscal appetite for reform that is
almost as great as the country’s moral obligation to reassess its
pretrial detention practices. We have a system in which detention is the default choice. Overestimating pretrial risks has
driven the jail population’s growth.
Judges imposing conditions of release or ordering pretrial
detention must be clear-eyed about the precise risks they are
trying to avoid or mitigate. The existing ambiguity is
symptomatic of broader pretrial risk-measurement and riskmanagement problems. These persistent problems threaten new
bail reform efforts. Greater precision is needed in the statutes,
in the research being done to study these problems, in the judges’ attempts to manage these risks, and in the risk-assessment
tools being developed to aid that endeavor.
While new risk-assessment tools promise improvements for
pretrial decisionmaking, they also pose special risks. The tools
319 Barack Obama, The President’s Role in Advancing Criminal Justice Reform, 130
Harv L Rev 811, 844 (2017) (“We should all be able to agree that the justice system
should never be used as a source of revenue. . . . I agree with Attorney General Lynch
that this is ‘an unconscionable state of affairs in a nation that outlawed debtors’ prisons
in 1833.’”), quoting Attorney General Loretta E. Lynch Delivers Remarks at the Eighth
Annual Judge Thomas A. Flannery Lecture (Department of Justice, Nov 15, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/6CDV-Y29T.
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lay bare obligations to address fundamental flaws in the existing
doctrine, and, indeed, they make those obligations more urgent.
If new risk-assessment tools map onto overbroad definitions of
risk, it is likely that detention rates will not decrease significantly. Worse yet, weak definitions of the risks being addressed
during the pretrial phase may gain legitimacy if supported by
“scientific” estimates.
If risk-assessment tools are to fulfill the promise of reducing
detention rates, they must identify and isolate those defendants
who pose the most serious and costly pretrial risks. We have
constitutional and statutory obligations to be clear about the
outcomes we are trying to prevent and to be sparing in our use
of liberty-restricting tools to avoid and manage those pretrial
risks.

